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ARTICLES
THE FEDERAL COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION
POWERS: SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF




In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"),1 the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided a statutory question and avoided a con-
stitutional one. The statutory question was whether section
404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which authorizes the
Army Corps of Engineers to exercise permit authority over
dredge-and-fill operations in the nation's waters, applies only
to waters that are "navigable." The constitutional question
was whether Congress has authority under the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution to regulate non-navigable wa-
ters.' After examining the CWA's language and legislative
history, the Court concluded that the CWA does in fact limit
the Corps' jurisdiction to "navigable" waters. Hence, it was
unnecessary for the Court to decide whether Congress has
constitutional authority to regulate non-navigable waters.
This article will examine the constitutional question that
the SWANCC Court did not decide. This constitutional ques-
* Chief Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, State of
California. J.D., Stanford Law School; B.A., Columbia University. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of any agency that he represents or has represented.
1. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). Throughout this article, the Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County will be referred to by the abbreviation "SWANCC."
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
699
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
tion involves two different but related federal powers-the
power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to pro-
tect navigation. Both federal powers are based on the Com-
merce Clause; indeed, the federal navigation power derives
from the federal power to regulate interstate commerce.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding
these two constitutional powers has proceeded along entirely
different paths, and the principles governing their application
are not the same. That is, the factors governing whether
Congress has properly exercised its general commerce powers
do not necessarily apply in determining whether Congress
has properly exercised its navigation power, and vice versa.
This anomaly likely occurred because the courts formulated
the federal navigation power early in the United States' con-
stitutional history, when Congress was thought to have very
limited commerce powers, and, conversely, fairly recent Su-
preme Court decisions substantially expanded the general
federal commerce power. The Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed or resolved these doctrinal anomalies.
This article will examine the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
regarding the federal commerce and navigation powers and
provide suggestions for avoiding, or at least reducing, the in-
consistencies between them.
In addition, this article will demonstrate that the Su-
preme Court's most recent Commerce Clause decisions raise
questions concerning the constitutionality of some federal en-
vironmental laws. The Court has recently scaled back the
federal commerce power, holding that it applies only to activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate economic interests.
This judicial trend raises questions about the sustainability of
federal environmental laws that Congress enacted primarily,
if not wholly, for environmental, rather than economic, pur-
poses. Although SWANCC did not decide the constitutional
question, the Court's constitutional analysis guided its statu-
tory analysis of the CWA, raising new questions concerning
the constitutionality of some federal environmental laws.
This article will conclude that most federal environmental
laws are unlikely to be affected by the Supreme Court's mod-
em Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but that some environ-
mental laws, notably the Endangered Species Act, are based
on an assumption of congressional power that may not be
supported by the Court's most recent Commerce Clause deci-
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sions.
This article will follow the following format. Part II will
briefly describe the Supreme Court's decision in the SWANCC
case and demonstrate that the decision apparently blurs the
distinction between Congress's general commerce powers and
its power to regulate navigation. Part III will focus on Con-
gress's general commerce powers and demonstrate how the
Supreme Court has recently provided for a more rigorous
scrutiny of congressional legislation adopted pursuant to such
powers, in order to preserve the states' traditional authority
to regulate essentially local matters. Part IV will focus on
Congress's navigation power, and demonstrate that this
power is governed by different principles than apply to its
general commerce power, which has created anomalies re-
garding the federal government's power under the Commerce
Clause that should be recognized and reconciled in future
cases. Finally, Part V will describe how the Supreme Court's
recent decisions regarding the federal commerce and naviga-
tion powers raise questions concerning the constitutionality of
some federal environmental laws, and will conclude that most
such laws are likely to survive facial challenges but that the
fate of others is less clear.
II. THE SWANCC DECISION
SWANCC is a consortium of small cities and villages lo-
cated near Chicago, Illinois, charged with developing a per-
manent disposal site for non-hazardous solid waste.
SWANCC purchased a 533-acre parcel of property that once
served as a sand and gravel mining site. During certain
times of the year, small ponds form on the site. After acquir-
ing the necessary permits under Illinois law to operate the
disposal site, SWANCC applied to the Army Corps of Engi-
neers for a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the dis-
charge of dredge-and-fill materials into "navigable waters,"
which is defined in section 502(7) as "waters of the United
States."
Prior to SWANCC's application, the Army Corps of Engi-
neers adopted a regulation providing that "waters of the
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001).
4. Id. at § 1362(7).
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United States," as used in section 502(7), are those that fall
within the traditional jurisdiction of the United States, which
generally are navigable waters or waters that have a nexus to
navigable waters used for interstate commerce.5 In 1977, the
Corps amended its definition of "waters of the United States"
to include "intrastate" waters and "wetlands" whose use may
affect interstate commerce; thus, the regulation applies irre-
spective of whether the waters are navigable.6 In 1986, to
"clarify" its regulations, the Corps adopted a preamble stating
that "waters of the United States" also includes waters that
"are or would be used as habitat" by "migratory birds."7 This
rule, generally referred to as the migratory bird rule, applies
to all waters inhabited by migratory birds, regardless of
whether the waters are navigable. In effect, the Corps' regu-
lations apply to all wetlands inhabited by migratory birds ir-
respective of traditional considerations of navigability.
In the SWANCC case, the Army Corps of Engineers con-
cluded that the consortium's proposed waste disposal site was
a habitat for migratory birds and denied the permit because
of the potential harm to the species. SWANCC brought an
action challenging the permit denial, arguing that the migra-
tory bird rule exceeded the Corps' authority under both the
CWA and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Army
Corps of Engineers and held that the migratory bird rule falls
within the scope of both the CWA and the Commerce Clause.9
According to the Seventh Circuit, the Corps' interpretation of
5. The regulation, adopted in 1974, defined "waters of the United States"
as those "which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently,
or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes
of interstate or foreign commerce." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974). The regu-
lation also provided that "[i]t is the water body's capability of use by the public
for purposes of transportation or commerce which is the determinative factor."
Id. at § 209.260(e)(1).
6. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1977). This regulation provides that "waters of
the United States" include "waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce. .. ." Id.
7. Final Rule for Regulating Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed.
Reg. 41206, 41217 (1986).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. See SWANCC v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999),
rev'd, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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its authority under the CWA and the Commerce Clause was
"reasonable" and thus entitled to deference because the CWA
"reaches as many waters as the Commerce Clause allows,"
and Congress's power under the Commerce Clause extends to
migratory birds that cross state lines.' °
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed
the Seventh Circuit decision, holding that the migratory bird
rule exceeded the Army Corps of Engineers' authority under
the CWA." The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reasoned that Congress, in enacting section 404,
intended only to assert its "traditional jurisdiction over wa-
ters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could
reasonably be so made.""2 The Court held that although the
Chevron doctrine" requires judicial deference to reasonable
administrative statutory interpretation, such deference was
not appropriate where, as in SWANCC, the administrative in-
terpretation would result in a "significant impingement of the
States' traditional and primary power over land and water
use"14 and would allow "federal encroachment upon a tradi-
tional state power."" The Court expressed reluctance to up-
hold interpretations of congressional legislation that would
invoke the "outer limits of Congress's power" without a "clear
indication" of Congress's intent. 6 Invoking its "prudential de-
sire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues,"7 the Court
concluded that the CWA was not intended to apply to "non-
navigable, isolated, intrastate waters."8 Since the migratory
bird rule applied regardless of whether the waters are navi-
gable or have a nexus with navigability, the rule exceeded the
Corps' authority under section 404 as applied to SWANCC's
proposed waste disposal site. 9
10. See SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 851-52.
11. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159.
12. Id. at 168 n.3, 172 (explaining that Congress did not intend to "exert
anything more than its commerce power over navigation").
13. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
14. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
15. Id. at 173.
16. See id. at 172.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 174. Addressing other issues of statutory interpretation, the
Court held that judicial deference should not be accorded to the Corps' subse-
quently-adopted migratory bird rule, that Congress had not "acquiesced" in the
703
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Earlier, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Riv-
erside Bayview Homes, Inc.2° that the Corps has jurisdiction
under section 404 over wetlands "adjacent" to navigable wa-
ters, but expressly refrained from deciding whether the
Corps' jurisdiction extended to wetlands "isolated" from navi-
gable waters.2 Since the small seasonal ponds in SWANCC
had no connection with navigable waters and thus were iso-
lated, SWANCC resolved the question left unanswered in
Riverside Bayview. After Riverside Bayview and SWANCC,
the Corps has authority over "adjacent" wetlands but not "iso-
lated" wetlands. The SWANCC Court distinguished Riverside
Bayview on grounds that the "adjacent" wetlands in that case
had a "significant nexus" with navigable waters but the iso-
lated wetlands in SWANCC did not. The Court recognized
that although the word "navigable" was given limited effect in
Riverside Bayview, it still must address the navigability com-
ponent: "It is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite
another to give it no effect whatever."22
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens and
signed by three other Justices, argued that the goals of fed-
eral water regulation during the twentieth century "shift[ed]
away from an exclusive focus on protecting navigability and
toward a concern for preventing environmental degrada-
tion."23 According to Justice Stevens, Congress has long been
regarded as having sovereign authority over navigable waters
and has often exercised such authority,24 which explains why
Congress limited the Corps' jurisdiction in section 404 to
"navigable waters." But, Justice Stevens argued, the phrase
"navigable waters" is defined in the CWA as "waters of the
United States" and thus applies to all waters in the nation ir-
respective of their navigability.25 Justice Stevens noted that
migratory bird rule that was subsequently added to the Corps' regulations, and
that section 404(g) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)-which provides for state
administration of certain navigable waters-does not affect the proper interpre-
tation of the Corps' section 404 authority. See id. at 170-74.
20. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
21. Id. at 131-32 n.8. The Army Corps of Engineers has adopted a regula-
tion providing that "adjacent" waters are those "bordering, contiguous, or
neighboring" navigable waters. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(b) (2001).
22. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172.
23. Id. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 177-81 (citing Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, § 13, 30 Stat.
1152 (1899), and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870)).
25. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 180-81.
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the goals of the CWA have nothing to do with navigation or
navigability.26 Therefore, he concluded that Congress in-
tended to exercise the full scope of its commerce power by
regulating all waters within the United States.27 According to
Justice Stevens, the migratory bird rule falls within Con-
gress's power to regulate commerce and hence within the
scope of the CWA.
The SWANCC Court held only that the CWA did not au-
thorize the Army Corps of Engineers to adopt the migratory
bird rule since the rule applied irrespective of whether the
waters were navigable, and refrained from reaching the con-
stitutional question whether Congress has constitutional au-
thority to regulate such waters. This constitutional issue,
however, was at the heart of the Court's statutory analysis.
The majority opinion construed the CWA to avoid the consti-
tutional question, and the dissenting opinion argued that the
statute should not be construed this way because the major-
ity's constitutional analysis was wrong.
The constitutional disagreement between the majority
and dissenting opinions reflects a fundamental difference be-
tween two discrete but related questions concerning the scope
of Congress's authority to regulate water under the Com-
merce Clause. The first question concerns the scope of Con-
gress's power to regulate activities affecting "commerce"
crossing state lines, particularly activities of a non-economic
nature. The second question is whether Congress has consti-
tutional power to regulate waters that are not navigable and
have no significant links with navigability. Thus, the first
question focuses on Congress's broad authority to regulate all
avenues of commerce, and the second on Congress's more lim-
ited authority to regulate water. These questions are obvi-
ously related because Congress's authority to regulate navi-
gable waters derives from its general powers to regulate
commerce under the Commerce Clause.
This article will now consider the constitutional question
not decided in SWANCC by examining Congress's general
commerce and navigation powers in more detail. The Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence regarding these federal powers
has proceeded along different lines, and the standards gov-
26. See id.
27. See id. at 181-82.
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erning their application are fundamentally different. The fac-
tors applicable in determining whether Congress has properly
exercised its general commerce powers do not necessarily ap-
ply in determining whether it has properly exercised its navi-
gation powers. Specifically, the navigability of water-which
is the constitutional linchpin of the federal navigation
power-is not determinative of whether the regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce, which is the
linchpin of the general federal commerce power. 8  In
SWANCC itself, the majority and dissenting opinions gener-
ally focused on Congress's navigation powers rather than its
general commerce powers in construing the statutory issue,
although the opinions sometimes blurred the distinction be-
tween the two.
29
Although the federal commerce and navigation powers
flow from the same source and one derives from the other, the
Supreme Court's precedents have treated them differently.
III. THE FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER
A. Nature of the Power
The Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to
regulate commerce among the states,3' has both active and
dormant aspects. 3' The clause affirmatively authorizes Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce 3' and restrains the
states from imposing unreasonable burdens on the free flow
of commerce among the states. 3 The restraint on state
power, however, is not absolute. The Clause's "dormant" as-
28. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
29. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citing United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (describing Congress's general authority to regulate inter-
state commerce)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (1995) (describing Congress's general
authority to regulate interstate commerce).
30. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); L. Graglia,
United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 719, 729-30 (1996).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
33. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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pect is based on the premise that the federal government has
exclusive authority to regulate interstate commerce; there-
fore, the states are prohibited from imposing unreasonable
burdens only to the extent that Congress has not authorized
them.34 In short, Congress can authorize what the Constitu-
tion otherwise forbids. In its active and dormant aspects, the
Commerce Clause serves as both a source of federal power
and a limitation on state power.
The Commerce Clause literally authorizes Congress only
to "regulate" interstate "commerce," which, according to the
strict meaning of the term, includes the traffic of goods but
not their manufacture or production.35 Indeed, the Founding
Fathers may have understood the term to be limited to the
traffic rather than the production of goods; in The Federalist,
Alexander Hamilton differentiated between commerce, agri-
culture, and manufacturing, regarding them as three sepa-
rate activities.36 The Founding Fathers also believed, how-
ever, that the federal power to regulate commerce must be
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the nation's changing
needs.37 The economic growth of the American nation in the
last century created an increasingly unified national econ-
omy, one that increasingly competed with the economies of
other nations.38 In response to these changing economic
needs, Congress adopted legislation regulating a broad range
of economic activities-communications, railroads and anti-
trust activities, among others-that were obviously far be-
yond the comprehension of the Founding Fathers. As the new
national economy emerged, the production of goods and ser-
vices became more closely intertwined with interstate com-
merce, thus blurring the distinction between production and
commerce.
As Congress legislated in response to changing economic
conditions, the Supreme Court struggled to define the scope of
Congress's commerce power and to determine the appropriate
34. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554; id. at 569 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35. See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 224 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 295, 319 (James Madison) (arguing that
"National Government will partake sufficiently of the spirit [of federalism], to
be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives
of their governments").
38. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568, 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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division of sovereign authority between the federal govern-
ment and the states. The inquiry, as Justice Cardozo once
wrote, is to determine "what is national and what is local in
the activities of commerce." 9 The debate, in a broad sense,
has been over the proper role of the courts in examining Con-
gress's exercise of its commerce power and in enforcing the
constitutional division of power between the federal govern-
ment and the states. Under one view, the courts are respon-
sible for determining and enforcing the limits of Congress's
commerce power, since under Marbury v. Madison," the
courts have the obligation to adjudicate constitutional ques-
tions. This judicial responsibility includes determining
whether the federally-regulated activity has sufficient links to
interstate commerce to justify the exercise of the federal
commerce power. Under another view, the courts generally
should defer to Congress's judgments regarding the scope of
its commerce powers. Under this view, if an activity, even
when otherwise seemingly "local," has some effect on inter-
state commerce, Congress has broad authority to regulate the
activity under its expansive commerce power; questions con-
cerning the scope of the federal commerce power should be re-
solved through the political process rather than the judicial
one. Under the former view, the federal government, unlike
states, does not have a general police power. Under the latter
view, the federal government-although not having a police
power per se-nonetheless has virtually equivalent authority
under Congress's broad authority to regulate commerce.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the federal
commerce power falls into three distinct periods of time, dur-
ing each of which one of the views described above has gained
ascendancy.
B. Pre-New Deal
During the first period of the Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, which lasted until the New Deal period
in the 1930s, the Court broadly construed the federal com-
merce power, but held that the power was subject to signifi-
cant limits developed by the courts through their power of ju-
39. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (quoting A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)).
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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dicial review. In Gibbons v. Ogden,41 Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, writing for the Court, rejected the argument that the
power is limited only to traffic; "[clommerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more-it is intercourse. "4' He cau-
tioned, however, that the power has limits:
[iThe enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to
which the power was to be extended, would not have been
made, had the intention been to extend the power to every
description. The enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something.., must be the exclu-
sively internal commerce of a State.
In Gibbons, the Court invalidated a permit issued under New
York law authorizing exclusive ferry service between New
York and New Jersey on grounds that the permit conflicted
with, and hence was preempted by, a permit issued to a com-
petitor under authority of federal law.
After Gibbons, as congressional economic regulation in-
creased, the Supreme Court clarified the outer limits of Con-
gress's commerce power. In several cases, the Court held that
the commerce power extended only to "commerce" and not to
"manufacturing" or "production" of goods; the latter activities,
the Court ruled, occur solely within a state and hence are be-
yond Congress's regulatory power." In other cases, the Court
held that the federal commerce power applies only to activi-
ties that have a "direct" rather than "indirect" effect on inter-
state commerce. 45 In effect, the "commerce-manufacturing"
distinction was a content-based restriction that examined the
specific nature of the regulated activity, and the "direct-
indirect" distinction was a cause-based restriction that exam-
ined the nexus between the regulated activity and its inter-
state effects. Although some Justices have labeled these dis-
41. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
42. Id. at 189.
43. Id. at 194-95.
44. See, e.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (distin-
guishing between "commerce," on the one hand, and "production," "manufactur-
ing," and "mining," on the other); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304
(1936) (distinguishing between "commerce" and "manufacturing").
45. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548
(1935) (holding that the wage and hour provision of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act has "no direct relation" to interstate commerce); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (holding that the federal statute regulating
wages and hours of miners had "secondary and indirect" effects on interstate
commerce).
709
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tinctions "formalistic"46-and regardless of their merits or
whether they are appropriate in today's world-the distinc-
tions appear to have been based on notions of literalness and
proximate cause that are common methods for judicial inter-
pretation of the law. Although these distinctions were con-
ceptually different in some ways, they fundamentally presup-
posed that the courts are responsible for determining the
proper demarcation between federal and state boundaries re-
garding regulation of commerce, and that the courts should
not simply defer to Congress to make such judgments. Apply-
ing these distinctions, the Court sustained Congress's com-
merce regulations in many instances,47 but also struck down
legislation regulating labor practices,48 child labor,49 union
membership, ° and wages and hours."
C. New Deal, Post-New Deal
During the second period of the Supreme Court's Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, which lasted from the New Deal
era of the 1930s until the mid-1990s, the Court adopted a
much more lenient standard of review, holding that the fed-
eral commerce power encompasses virtually every aspect of
national life and that the courts should defer to congressional
judgments regarding the exercise of the commerce power.
During this period, the Court upheld the federal commerce
power if the regulated activity "affects" or "substantially af-
fects" interstate commerce, 52 and applied a "rational basis"
46. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 569 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(upholding Interstate Commerce Commission order fixing railroad rates); Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (upholding application of federal an-
titrust laws to meat dealers located in a single state).
48. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (invalidating
congressional act regulating price of coal and wages and hours for miners).
49. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating congres-
sional act prohibiting shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured
at factories using child labor).
50. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating congres-
sional act prohibiting discharge of employee because of his union membership).
51. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 545-
48 (1935) (invalidating wage and hour provision of National Industrial Recovery
Act).
52. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (holding that federal commerce power applies if activity
"affects" interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)
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standard in reviewing congressional judgment. 3 By rejecting
the "manufacturing-commerce" and "direct-indirect effects"
distinctions and focusing instead on whether the activity "af-
fects" or "substantially affects" interstate commerce, the
Court broadened its interpretation of Congress's commerce
powers; for example, a "manufacturing" activity that lacks a
"direct" effect on interstate commerce nonetheless may sub-
stantially "affect" such commerce. Moreover, the rational ba-
sis standard of review is highly deferential to congressional
judgments because it requires only that the means chosen by
Congress are reasonably related to constitutionally permissi-
ble ends.54 Applying this highly deferential standard of re-
view, the Court consistently sustained congressional legisla-
tion adopted pursuant to the federal commerce power,
upholding, for example, Congress's authority to regulate labor
unions,55 intrastate coal mining,56 restaurants,57 and hotels
and inns. 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court during this period
sustained every congressional regulation that it reviewed un-
der the Commerce Clause. In the Court's view, the federal
commerce power appeared unlimited.
The Supreme Court's approach during this period was re-
flected in its landmark decision in Wickard v. Filburn,59
where the Court sustained the constitutionality of amend-
ments to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The
amendments restricted the production of homegrown wheat
as part of a national program to sustain the market price for
wheat. An Ohio farmer who grew wheat for his own con-
sumption on his farm challenged the constitutionality of the
amendments, arguing that since he did not sell his wheat in
the market, his wheat did not enter the stream of commerce
(holding that power applies if activity has "substantial economic effect"); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that power ap-
plies if activity has "close and substantial relation" to interstate commerce).
53. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 276;
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 (1968); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
54. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 276;
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964); Pre-
seault, 494 U.S. at 17.
55. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 1.
56. See Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 264.
57. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294.
58. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 241.
59. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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and its production had no effect on the interstate market.
The Court rejected his argument, ruling that-although his
wheat may not be an article of commerce-its production
nonetheless may affect the interstate market for wheat; the
farmer could be encouraged to sell his wheat in the market if
prices rose, and, even if he did not sell his wheat, his home-
grown production would relieve him from the need to pur-
chase wheat in the market, thus affecting the market. °
Although the Wickard Court acknowledged that the
farmer's homegrown wheat may be "trivial" as applied to in-
terstate commerce, the Court said that his contribution,
"taken together with that of many others similarly situated,
is far from trivial."6 Thus, the Court aggregated the produc-
tion of all producers of homegrown wheat to determine
whether their production collectively, even if not individually,
affects interstate commerce and hence fell within the federal
regulatory power.62 Under Wickard's aggregation principle,
Congress can regulate an entire class of producers whose col-
lective product may affect interstate commerce, even though
the production of an individual class member will not have
this effect. The aggregation principle appears to differ from
the Supreme Court's normal constitutional and statutory
analysis, which holds that a statute or regulation may be
valid as applied to an entire class but nonetheless invalid "as
applied" to an individual within the class. 3 In any event,
Wickard's aggregation principle, coupled with the Supreme
Court's deferential "rational basis" standard of review, effec-
tively enabled Congress to regulate virtually all aspects of na-
tional life under its commerce power.
In National League of Cities v. Usery, decided in 1976,
the Supreme Court briefly departed from its post-New Deal
era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, narrowly ruling that
the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which reserves for
the states powers not delegated to the federal government,
60. See id. at 128.
61. Id. at 127-28.
62. The aggregation principle has been applied in other cases. See, e.g., Ho-
del v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 324-25 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
154 (1971); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301.
63. See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1997); Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 709 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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limits the scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.64 The Usery Court held that the Constitution bal-
ances Congress's delegated powers under the Commerce
Clause and the states' reserved powers under the Tenth
Amendment, thus preventing Congress from impairing the
"integral governmental functions" of the states.65 The Court
rejected its earlier view, as expressed in United States v.
Darby,66 that the Tenth Amendment expresses the simple
"truism" that powers not delegated to the federal government
are reserved to the states but that this truism has no sub-
stantive effect on constitutional interpretation. 7 Thus, under
Usery, the Tenth Amendment shield effectively blunted the
Commerce Clause sword. Applying this shield, the Court in-
validated federal wage and hour standards as applied to the
states. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority,68 however, decided in 1985, the Supreme Court nar-
rowly overturned Usery and ruled that the Tenth Amend-
ment, by itself, poses no obstacle to federal regulation under
the Commerce Clause. According to the Garcia Court, the
Founding Fathers indicated that constitutional restraints on
the federal commerce power "inhered principally in the work-
ings of the National Government itself," and therefore the
states' sovereign interests "are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power.
69
D. The Lopez and Morrison Decisions
During the third period of the Supreme Court's Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, from the mid-1990s to the pre-
sent, the Court has held that the Commerce Clause imposes
substantive limits on the scope of the federal power and that
the courts are constitutionally obligated to determine and ap-
ply these limits in assessing the validity of congressional leg-
64. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruling Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
65. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
66. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
67. See id. at 124; Usery, 426 U.S. at 843-44.
68. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
69. Id. at 552.
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islation. In United States v. Lopez,7" decided in 1995, the
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,71
which prohibited possession of guns near schools. In United
States v. Morrison,72 decided in 2000, the Court struck down a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act creating a fed-
eral civil remedy for acts of violence against women.71 Al-
though the Court stated in these cases that it was not signifi-
cantly departing from its precedents,74 the Court clearly
established a more exacting inquiry into Congress's commerce
power legislation than in its post-New Deal cases. Indeed,
Lopez, Morrison and related decisions were the first to strike
down congressional legislation adopted under the Commerce
Clause since the New Deal era, excepting National League of
Cities v. Usery, which was overruled in Garcia.7
The more exacting inquiry mandated by Lopez and Mor-
rison is manifested in several different ways. First, the Court
held that Congress's commerce power applies only to activi-
ties that "substantially affect" interstate commerce, not those
that simply "affect" such commerce.7 ' This standard, the
Court said, requires a showing of a reasonable nexus between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce, rather than
70. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
72. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
74. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (the conclusion is "consistent with the great
weight of our case law"); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 & n.3.
75. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and United States v.
Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Supreme Court held that Congress may not,
under its commerce powers, "commandeer" state resources in order to fulfill
congressionally-mandated objectives. In New York, the Court struck down por-
tions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42
U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2)(C), which required the states to "take title" to-and hence
dispose of-low level radioactive waste, stating that Congress cannot "simply
'commandeer the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" New York, 505 U.S. at 161
(quoting from Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)). In Printz, the Court struck down portions of the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), which required local law en-
forcement officials to conduct background checks of persons applying for hand-
guns. The Court in both cases held that Congress has broad authority to pursue
federal objectives under its commerce powers, in that it can preempt state laws
that obstruct such objectives and can encourage voluntary state compliance
with federal objectives through its spending powers, but that Congress may not
direct the states to adopt policies to achieve these objectives, or mandate utiliza-
tion of state resources for this purpose.
76. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).
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simply a "but-for" connection." Second, the Court ruled that
"commerce," as used in the Commerce Clause, refers to "eco-
nomic activity" and thus does not embrace non-economic ac-
tivity.7 ' According to the Court, its precedents-even those
such as Wickard v. Filburn that stretched the Commerce
Clause to its limits-involved economic activity.79 Therefore,
the Court said, the Commerce Clause does not extend to such
non-economic activities as gun possession near schools, as in
Lopez, or gender-based acts of violence, as in Morrison."
Third, the Court said that congressional findings supporting a
"nexus" between the regulated activity and interstate com-
merce are not given weight if, as in Morrison, the findings
employ a constitutionally impermissible standard different
from the "substantially affects" standard adopted by the
Court."1 Finally, the Court stated that although it did not re-
ject Wickard's aggregation principle, it would be disinclined to
apply the principle in cases involving non-economic activi-
ties.82 Thus, by requiring a stronger nexus between the regu-
lated activity and interstate commerce and by defining "com-
merce" to mean economic activities, the Court established a
more rigorous standard of Commerce Clause review than in
previous cases.
The Supreme Court justified this higher standard of
scrutiny on grounds that it has a constitutional obligation
under Marbury v. Madison to adjudicate constitutional ques-
77. See id. at 562 ("requisite nexus with interstate commerce") (citing
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (re-
jecting "but-for reasoning").
78. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 ("economic activity"); Morrison, 529 U.S. at
611 ("economic endeavor").
79. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
80. The Lopez Court rejected the Government's argument that the posses-
sion of guns near schools affected interstate commerce because violent crime
affects national productivity by increasing public costs, discouraging travel, and
impairing the educational process. See id. at 563-64. The Court stated that the
link between gun possession and interstate commerce was "attenuated" and
would result in a "general police power" for the federal government and that
such a power has not been constitutionally delegated. See id. at 529; Morrison,
529 U.S. at 612-13.
81. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-16.
82. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4, 613, 617 ("We
accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, vio-
lent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on inter-
state commerce.").
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tions, rather than simply defer to congressional judgments."
As the Court noted, Marbury held that the courts rather than
Congress have the responsibility "to say what the law is."
84
The question, in the Court's mind, involves a judicial function
rather than a legislative one, and therefore belongs in the ju-
dicial rather than the political arena. By adopting this higher
standard of review, the Court effectively abandoned the less-
exacting "rational basis" standard that had previously gov-
erned the Court's Commerce Clause analysis.
The constitutional importance of this higher level of scru-
tiny, the Lopez/Morrison Court said, is that it protects the
constitutional system of checks and balances, including a di-
vision of the nation's sovereign power between the federal
government and the states.85 This constitutional division of
power preventing the centralization of a single national
power, the Court stated, was adopted by the Founding Fa-
thers to secure and protect the liberty of the nation's citi-
zens.6 According to the Court, if the judiciary did not carry
out its responsibility of limiting the federal commerce power,
Congress would have virtually unfettered authority to regu-
late all aspects of national life; it could, for example, regulate
such inherently local matters as family law, including mar-
riage, divorce, and child custody.87 If Congress possessed such
broad powers, the Court stated, Congress could exercise a
general police power to regulate the conduct of the nation's
citizens, a power that has not been constitutionally delegated.
The Court chastised the dissenting opinions for their failure
to articulate any practical limits to the federal commerce
power, and for their "obliteration" of the distinction between
"what is national and what is local."88 Although the Court did
not overtly adopt Usery's balancing approach-which bal-
anced federal and state sovereign powers under the Com-
merce Clause and the Tenth Amendment-the effect was
83. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616.
84. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 (also citing Marbury). See also
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
85. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
86. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Morrison, 529
U.S. at 616 n.7.
87. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
88. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 n.8.
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much the same, in that the Constitution limits federal power
to ensure that the nation's sovereign power is shared by the
states.
The dissenting Justices in Lopez and Morrison argued
that the majority opinions had overturned decades of settled
jurisprudence dating from the New Deal era and were remi-
niscent of the Court's decisions striking down federal and
state laws for their failure to comport with economic laissez-
faire principles thought to be imbedded in the Constitution. 9
According to the dissenting opinions, Congress is better quali-
fied than the courts to determine the need for legislation to
address the nation's social and economic problems; therefore,
the question is a political one rather than a judicial one. °
Therefore, the Court generally should defer to congressional
judgments on these political issues and continue to apply the
less exacting "rational basis" standard in reviewing such con-
gressional judgments.91 In his dissenting opinion in Morrison,
Justice Souter maintained that "politics, not judicial review,
should mediate between state and national interests" and
that "the Constitution remits" conflicts between federal and
state powers "to politics,"92 appearing to suggest that the
courts have virtually no role in adjudicating the reach of the
federal commerce power. Moreover, the dissenting opinions
argued that an activity not strictly economic can have a sig-
nificant effect on commerce among the states, particularly if,
as the Wickard Court held, the activities of an entire class are
aggregated to determine their effect; therefore, "commerce,"
as used in the Commerce Clause, should be construed broadly
rather than narrowly.98
After Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court's Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence has to some extent reverted to
what it was before the Court liberalized its analysis during
the New Deal period. That is, the Lopez/Morrison Court
struck down congressional legislation perceived as beyond
Congress's commerce powers, just as the Court occasionally
89. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting), 615 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting), 655 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
90. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529
U.S. at 647-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 647, 649 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 641-46 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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did in the pre-New Deal era. The Lopez/Morrison Court,
however, did not altogether embrace the Court's constitu-
tional methodology in the pre-New Deal era. That is, it did
not apply the distinction between "commerce" and "manufac-
turing," nor between "direct" and "indirect" effects, on inter-
state commerce. Rather, the Lopez/Morrison Court applied
much of the constitutional methodology of the post-New Deal
Court, by considering whether the regulated activity "af-
fected" or "substantially affected" interstate commerce. Thus,
the Court considered the nexus between congressional means
and ends rather than applying the "formalistic" distinctions of
the past.
The Lopez /Morrison Court changed recent constitutional
methodology in two significant respects without actually
overruling any of its Commerce Clause precedents. First, and
most obviously, the Court ruled that the word "commerce" in
the Commerce Clause connotes economic activity, and cannot
extend beyond that limited connotation to include non-
economic activity. Moreover, the Court said, the aggregation
principle that generally applies in Commerce Clause cases-
which often is essential in sustaining congressional regula-
tion-may not apply to congressional regulation of non-
economic activity. Manifestly, if aggregation of economic ac-
tivities is necessary to bring such activities within the reach
of Congress's commerce powers, a non-aggregation approach
as applied to non-economic activities will often result in such
activities falling outside the scope of the commerce power.
Second, the Lopez/Morrison Court ruled that the courts
have the fundamental responsibility of examining the nexus
between congressional means and ends, and determining
whether Congress is actually regulating a subject that has
national, rather than local, consequences. The Court will not
simply defer to congressional judgments, nor be bound by
congressional findings. Commerce Clause analysis thereby
implicates not only the division of sovereign power between
the federal government and the states, but also the separa-
tion of powers between the judicial and legislative branches.94
Thus, under Lopez and Morrison, the responsibility to deter-
94. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court recently held that the courts
rather than Congress are responsible for determining the scope of Congress's
power to regulate the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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mine the federal and state constitutional roles rests in the ju-
dicial rather than the legislative realm.
Lopez and Morrison promise to have a major effect on
constitutional interpretation of Congress's environmental
laws. These decisions hold that the federal commerce power
applies only to activities having substantial economic im-
pacts. Congress's environmental laws, on the other hand,
generally have been adopted for environmental rather than
economic purposes. Before addressing this significant consti-
tutional question, this article will examine a related princi-
ple-the federal power to regulate navigation-that is rele-
vant in measuring the breadth of the federal power to
regulate commerce in the nation's waterways.
IV. THE FEDERAL NAVIGATION POWER
A. Nature of the Power
Under its navigation power, Congress has authority to
regulate navigable waters that are used as the highways of
commerce among the states. 5 This power derives from the
Commerce Clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate
commerce among the states.96 As the Supreme Court ex-
plained, navigable waters are the "public property of the na-
tion, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress." "
Therefore, the federal government possesses a sovereign
navigation "servitude" or "easement" in navigable waters that
is paramount to the rights of others.98
The Supreme Court has substantially broadened Con-
gress's authority to regulate navigable waters in order to pro-
tect navigation interests. First, the Court has held that the
federal navigation power applies not only to waters that are
95. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-80 (1979); United
States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1955); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkin-
son Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311
U.S. 377 (1940); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S.
53, 69 (1913); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 89 (1824).
96. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. at 404; Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 63.
97. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 63.
98. See id. ("servitude"); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178 ("servitude"); United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736 (1950) ("easement").
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actually navigable, but also to waters that are "susceptible" of
navigation, meaning that they need only be capable of sup-
porting navigation by physical improvements." The purpose
of the navigation power, the Court has reasoned, is to protect
the "availability" of the nation's waterways to serve naviga-
tion purposes, regardless of whether they currently serve
such purposes.00 In addition, the federal navigation power
applies to all the nation's navigable waters, irrespective of
whether they are part of a state's internal waters.0 1 Thus,
the navigation power applies to navigable waters that are lo-
cated wholly within a state, not just interstate waters; the as-
sumption is that activities in internal navigable waters may
affect interstate commerce as much as activities in waters
flowing directly between states. Finally, the federal naviga-
tion power applies not only to navigable waters, but also to
non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. Since the
purpose of the federal power is to protect the highways of in-
terstate commerce, the tributaries that influence the high-
ways' capacity to bear commerce also fall within the scope of
the power.
The federal navigation power, as a servitude or ease-
ment, has two important limiting characteristics in the
United States' constitutional system. First, and most impor-
tantly, this federal power limits the states' historic authority
to regulate their water resources.103 The nature of the states'
sovereign interests in water has been spelled out in a series of
99. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (explaining that riv-
ers are regarded as "public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact,"
and they are "navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water"). See also Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 406; The Mon-
tello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874).
100. See Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 406-07.
101. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172; Utah v. United States, 403 U.S.
9, 10 (1971); Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 404-05.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960);
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). The Supreme
Court has also held that the federal navigation power extends to artificial bod-
ies of water lying within a state, such as man-made canals that are used for
transporting commerce between ports in different states. See In re Boyer, 109
U.S. 629 (1884); Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 172 n.7.
103. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950); United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
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Supreme Court decisions stretching from the early nineteenth
century to the present; these decisions, which have never
been overruled, form the foundation of much jurisprudence
defining the federal and state roles in water regulation. T'
Under these decisions, the states are held to have sovereign
authority over their navigable waters. This authority derives
directly from the King's sovereignty under the English com-
mon law. That is, the King's sovereign authority over navi-
gable waters was transferred directly to the original thirteen
states at the time of the American Revolution, and thus the
original states possessed full sovereignty over such waters,
subject only to powers surrendered in the Constitution to the
federal government, predominantly including the federal
power to regulate navigation.0 5 Under the equal footing doc-
trine, new states were admitted to statehood on the same
terms and conditions as-that is, on an equal footing with-
the original thirteen states; hence, they acquired the same
sovereign authority over their navigable waters as the origi-
nal states. Thus, the states have sovereign authority over
their navigable waters, subject only to the federal govern-
ment's constitutionally-delegated powers, including its navi-
gation power. The equal footing doctrine provides the consti-
tutional basis for the states to regulate and control water
rights.
0 7
104. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363, 372-74 (1977); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 717; United
States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-27, 49-50
(1894); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324, 338 (1877); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223, 229 (1845);
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
105. "[Wlhen the revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject
only to the rights since surrendered to the general government." Martin, 41
U.S. at 410.
106. See Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. at 223, 229; Shively, 152 U.S. at 26-27, 49-
50; Barney, 94 U.S. at 338; Hardin, 140 U.S. at 381-82.
107. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1978); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704-06 (1899). Apart from the constitutionally-based equal
footing doctrine, Congress has authorized the states to exercise water rights au-
thority over their internal waters. In the nineteenth century, Congress enacted
several public lands and mining statutes, notably the Mining Acts of 1866 and
1870, 14 Stat. 251 (1866), as amended, 16 Stat. 217 (1871), 43 U.S.C. § 661, and
the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. (1877), 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23, which pro-
vided for disposition of public domain lands to miners, homesteaders and others.
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Second, the federal navigation power also limits the right
of private water rights holders to claim property interests in
navigable waters that are paramount to the public interest.
According to the Supreme Court, the federal government's
exercise of its navigation power does not give rise to claims
for compensation under the Takings Clause by those whose
rights are impaired by exercise of the power."8 Since the fed-
eral government has a sovereign "servitude" in navigable wa-
ters, "the running water in a great navigable stream is [inca-
pable] of private ownership," and hence no one can claim
compensation for the loss of their rights."9 The Court has
since suggested, however, that the United States' exercise of
its navigation power can result in an unconstitutional taking
of property if the power is not adequately related to naviga-
tion."' The Court, which has breathed new life into the Tak-
ings Clause in other contexts,"' may have done the same in
the federal navigation context.
Thus, the federal navigation doctrine, as construed by the
Supreme Court, is both a source of federal power and a limi-
tation on such power. On the one hand, the doctrine assumes
that navigable waters are linked to interstate or national in-
terests, and therefore that the federal government has sover-
eign authority to regulate such waters. On the other hand,
the doctrine also assumes that non-navigable waters are
linked to local interests, and therefore that-except for the
limited federal right to reserve water for use on federal
These acts regulated water on such lands under the laws of the states. Thus,
these acts protected the water rights on these former public domain lands from
claims of the United States and its patentees. In California Oregon Power Co.
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935), the Supreme Court noted
that these statutes collectively "effected a severance of all waters upon the pub-
lic domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself." Id. at 158.
Therefore, the states have "plenary control" of their non-navigable waters. Id.
at 163-64. The congressional "severance" of water from the public lands pro-
vides another basis, in addition to the equal footing doctrine, for state regula-
tion and control of water rights.
108. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53(1913); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1955); United
States v. Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
109. See Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 60; Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
110. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 170-80.
111. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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lands"'2-the states have exclusive authority to regulate non-
navigable waters. That is the clear import of Supreme Court
decisions holding that the federal navigation power limits the
states' sovereign interests in water under equal footing prin-
ciples; the states' sovereign interests, which are reserved to
them under the Tenth Amendment, remain intact to the ex-
tent they are not limited by the federal government's dele-
gated powers, particularly its power to regulate navigation.
Thus, the division between federal and state regulatory au-
thority over water is based on the distinction between navi-
gable and non-navigable waters; this distinction controls the
balance between federal commerce interests and state equal
footing interests in the context of water regulation. As the
Supreme Court explained, "except where the reserved rights
or navigation servitude of the United States are invoked, the
State has total authority over its internal waters.""3
B. Expansion of Navigational Power Beyond Navigation
Purpose
Congress has adopted-and the Supreme Court has sus-
tained-several major laws pursuant to the federal naviga-
tion power, some of which have regulated water for purposes
other than navigation. These laws expand the federal navi-
gation power beyond its original purpose of protecting naviga-
tion.
In the late nineteenth century, Congress adopted several
acts to protect the navigability of the nation's rivers and har-
bors,"' principally the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 ("the
1899 act")," 5 which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers
to prohibit obstructions in navigable waters. Under the 1899
112. Under the reserved rights doctrine, Congress has authority under the
Constitution's Property Clause to reserve water for use on federal lands, and is
deemed to exercise such authority when reserving lands from the public do-
main. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Property Clause); United States v.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138
(1976).
113. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978) (citing United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899)).
114. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1896, ch. 314, 29
Stat. 234; Rivers and Harbors Act of 1894, ch. 299, 28 Stat. 363; Rivers and
Harbors Appropriations Act of 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426; Rivers and Harbors
Appropriations Act of 1886, ch. 929, 24 Stat. 329.
115. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq (2001)).
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act, no person may create an "obstruction" to the "navigable
capacity" of the nation's waterways, or deposit "refuse" in
navigable waters, without a permit issued by the Army Corps
of Engineers."6 The 1899 act was adopted in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch,"7 which held that no federal common law may pre-
clude obstructions and nuisances in navigable waters, and
thus federal courts cannot enjoin the construction of naviga-
tion-obstructing bridges that have been approved by local au-
thorities. The 1899 act filled the void created by the Wil-
lamette Iron Bridge decision. In United States v. Republic
Steel Corp.,"' the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the
Army Corps of Engineers' authority under the 1899 act, hold-
ing that the Corps has jurisdiction to regulate obstructions
that impair potential navigation as well as actual naviga-
tion."9 The 1899 act, of course, was adopted pursuant to Con-
gress's power to regulate navigation because it expressly ap-
plied only to navigable waters and had the singular goal of
protecting navigation.
In the early twentieth century, Congress, aware of its
growing responsibilities for promoting the nation's economic
development and prodded by two progressive presidents,
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, enacted two land-
mark pieces of legislation in order to utilize the nation's wa-
terways for the advancement of national economic goals. The
first act, the Reclamation Act of 1902 (the "Reclamation
Act")," 0 promoted development of the West's arid lands, and
the second, the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (the "Power
Act"),"' promoted development of hydroelectric power. The
Reclamation and Power Acts were similar to the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899 in that they relied primarily, if not
wholly, on the federal navigation power for their constitu-
tionality. Unlike the 1899 act, however, the Reclamation and
Power Acts involved purposes that were related, at most, only
116. Sections 9, 10, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 ("obstruction"); section 13, 33
U.S.C. § 407 ("refuse").
117. 125 U.S. 1 (1988).
118. 362 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1960).
119. See id. at 485-86.
120. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at
43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1986)).
121. Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-793, 795-818, 820-820r (2000)).
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tangentially to navigation.
The Reclamation Act of 1902 provides for federal con-
struction and operation of reclamation projects that divert,
store and distribute the waters of the western states for var-
ied purposes-agricultural, flood control, navigation, and so
forth." In creating its reclamation program, Congress de-
termined that important national interests were at stake, re-
jecting the view of those representatives of (mostly) eastern
states, who argued that reclamation was a local rather than
national function." 3 When enacting the Reclamation Act,
Congress relied on its authority to regulate navigable waters
under the Commerce Clause even though reclamation-which
involves re-distribution of water for agricultural and other
benefits-is a different and much broader goal than naviga-
tion. "'24 Congress subsequently authorized individual recla-
mation projects pursuant to the umbrella authority of the
1902 acts, and these amendatory laws spelled out more
clearly the comprehensive goals that Congress had in mind.
For example, the congressional act authorizing California's
Central Valley Project ("CVP")-the largest federal project
authorized under the umbrella authority of the 1902 act-
provides that the CVP's purposes are to provide irrigation
water, improve navigation, control floods, prevent salinity in-
trusion, promote recreation, and protect and enhance fish and
wildlife.12 ' Thus, the Reclamation Act and its amendatory
acts were adopted in part for navigation purposes, but more
importantly, for non-navigation purposes as well. To lessen
the intrusive impacts on the states' historic authority to regu-
late their water resources, the 1902 act provides that the fed-
eral projects authorized under the act are governed by state
law; state law controls the "appropriation, use, or distribu-
tion" of water developed by the projects, and the Secretary of
122. See generally California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
123. See Roderick Walston, Reborn Federalism in Western Water Law, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1645, 1647 n.8 (1979).
124. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736, 738
(1950).
125. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, ch. 832, 50 Stat. 844; Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1940, ch. 895, 54 Stat. 1198; Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 294; Gerlach,
339 U.S. at 731. See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (1963) (hold-
ing that Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617 et seq., which establishes
federal projects on lower Colorado River, was adopted for multiple purposes of
flood control, navigation, power generation, irrigation, and other purposes).
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the Interior must "proceed in conformity with" such state
laws.126
The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 was incorporated
in the Federal Power Act of 1935,27 and these acts (hereinaf-
ter collectively the "Power Act") provided for hydroelectric
power development of the nation's waterways. The Power Act
created a federal agency, the Federal Power Commission (now
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), to regulate hy-
dropower development in the nation's waterways.' 28  The
Commission is authorized to issue licenses for dams or other
works for the "development and improvement of navigation"
and for the development of "power" in any streams "over
which Congress has jurisdiction under its authority to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States."'29 Under the Power Act, "navigable waters" are de-
fined as those "over which Congress has jurisdiction under its
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States."'' 0  Since the Power Act defines
"navigable waters" as co-extensive with Congress's authority
to regulate interstate commerce, Congress evidently believed
that it was acting pursuant to its commerce powers in provid-
ing for hydropower development in navigable waters. Like
the Reclamation Act, the Power Act minimized the intrusion
on the states' water rights authority by providing that state
laws shall govern the "control, appropriation, use, or distribu-
tion" of water used in "irrigation or for municipal or other
uses."
31
Thus, Congress passed the Reclamation Act and the
Power Act partially for navigation purposes, but also for
other, broader purposes, such as irrigation, power, and so
forth. These acts reflected a growing congressional recogni-
tion that much of the nation's economic development must be
carried out by federal operational or regulatory programs, al-
126. See Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1986)); California v. United States, 438 U.S.
at 645.
127. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-793, 795-818, 820-820r.
128. See id.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803 (2000).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 796(8) (1994).
131. 16 U.S.C. §§ 802(b), 821 (1994). See generally First Iowa Hydro-Elec.
Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946); California v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
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though both acts contained savings provisions to protect the
states' authority to manage their water resources. Nonethe-
less, the Reclamation Act and Power Act significantly altered
the federal landscape in that Congress began to regulate
navigable waters for broad national purposes unrelated to
navigation. The question arose whether Congress, in enact-
ing these landmark federal laws, had authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate waters for purposes that bore
little, if any, relationship to navigation.
The Supreme Court answered this question by holding
that Congress's power to regulate commerce in the nation's
waterways extends beyond the interest of simply protecting
navigation. In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co.,13" ' the Court upheld the Federal Power Commission's au-
thority to issue hydropower licenses under the Power Act
even though such licenses had no navigation purpose. In that
case, the lower courts determined that the waterway in ques-
tion was not navigable and hence the Commission lacked ju-
risdiction to impose conditions unrelated to navigation.' The
Supreme Court, examining the factual issue de novo, con-
cluded that the waters-although not actually navigable-
were "susceptible" of navigation through improvements that
had yet to be made, and hence the waters qualified as "navi-
gable" waters for Commerce Clause purposes.' Moreover,
the Court reasoned, once the Commission had jurisdiction
over "navigable" waters under the Commerce Clause, its con-
stitutional reach is not confined strictly to navigation pur-
poses but instead extends to other purposes, such as power
production, flood control and watershed development.'' The
federal power to regulate navigable waters, the Court said, is
"plenary" and "as broad as the needs of commerce. " 36 The
Court rejected the argument that the Tenth Amendment
compels a different result, reasoning that the states, in form-
ing the Union, delegated authority to the federal government
to regulate interstate commerce and that this power encom-
passes the authority to regulate navigable waters.'37 There-
132. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
133. See id. at 398.
134. See id. at 406-20.
135. See id. at 426.
136. Id. at 424, 426, 427.
137. See id. at 428-29.
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fore, the Court held, the navigation power extends beyond the
protection of navigation itself.'38
The constitutionality of Congress's reclamation program
was examined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ger-
lach Live Stock Co.139 There, the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether riparian water users could seek compensation
from the United States for loss of their rights as a result of
California's Central Valley Project. The United States argued
that the federal reclamation program was adopted pursuant
to Congress's authority to regulate navigable waters and that
the United States need not pay compensation to those whose
rights are impaired by exercise of this authority; no one has
the right, the United States argued, to claim compensable
property rights in waters that belong to the public. 4 ° The Su-
preme Court did not reach the constitutional question be-
cause Congress had provided in the Reclamation Act itself
that compensation must be paid to those whose rights are
impaired.' Nonetheless, the Court commented that Con-
gress justifiably relied on its "navigation power" in enacting
the reclamation laws "on the whole," and noted that certain
"components" of the project were directly related to naviga-
tion.' The Court also noted, however, that the navigation ef-
fects of the projects are "economically insignificant" as com-
pared with the values realized from "redistribution of water
benefits,"' and declared that to the extent that the project
benefits exceed the navigation purpose, they can be sustained
under the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution.'44 It is
138. Subsequently, the Supreme Court briefly stated, without extensive
analysis, that the Federal Power Commission has jurisdiction over non-
navigable waters used to provide electricity transmitted across state lines. The
court supported this conclusion by citing conventional Commerce Clause cases
rather than navigation cases. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381
U.S. 90 (1965). The Union Electric decision, which analyzed the federal gov-
ernment's jurisdiction over waters under its general power to regulate inter-
state commerce, appears inconsistent with the Appalachian Power decision,
which analyzed the federal government's jurisdiction over waters based on their
navigability.
139. 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
140. See id. at 731.
141. See id. at 737.
142. See id. at 736, 738.
143. Id. at 729.
144. See id. at 738 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (General Welfare
Clause)). In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court again cited the General
Welfare Clause as the constitutional basis for the federal government's reclama-
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doubtful that the Court today would rely on the General Wel-
fare Clause in upholding the federal reclamation program or
any other program, because such a broad, open-ended power
to regulate the "general welfare" is tantamount to a federal
police power, which the Supreme Court has unequivocally
145held that the federal government does not possess.
Thus, as exemplified in Appalachian Power and Gerlach,
the Supreme Court has not applied traditional Commerce
Clause analysis in determining whether federal regulation of
the nation's waterways is within the scope of the federal
commerce power. Under traditional Commerce Clause analy-
sis, the Court determines whether the regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce, which, according
to Lopez and Morrison, means interstate economic interests.
In water regulation cases, however, the Court determines
whether the regulated waters are navigable or have a reason-
able nexus with navigability, and concludes that the federal
commerce power applies if such a relationship exists. This
distinction between different modes of Commerce Clause
analysis-depending on whether the avenue of commerce is a
waterway-derives principally from the Court's traditional
deference to the states' sovereign authority to regulate their
water resources under equal footing principles. That is, the
Court, perhaps more in form than substance, has reaffirmed
the states' sovereign interests in water regulation by holding
that the federal commerce power applies only if federal navi-
gability interests are somehow affected-even though the fed-
eral power may be asserted for purposes other than naviga-
tion.
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely held
that Commerce Clause analysis is different in cases involving
water regulation, this conclusion may also be inferred from
tion programs. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294 (1958)
(citing Gerlach for support that General Welfare Clause supports the Reclama-
tion Act of 1902); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (citing Gerlach for
support that General Welfare Clause supports Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 617 et seq.). In California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 670 (1978),
however, the Court did not mention the General Welfare Clause as the constitu-
tional basis for the Reclamation Act of 1902 and implied that the Act could be
sustained under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 8, cl.
1 (stating that he federal government "preserved its authority to determine how
federal funds should be expended").
145. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65; United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
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the Court's routine description of its constitutional methodol-
ogy. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court stated that the federal
commerce power comes into play in three different types of
cases-those involving the "channels" of interstate commerce,
those involving the "instrumentalities" of such commerce, and
those involving "activities" that "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce.146 The Court has distinguished between
cases involving the "channels" of interstate commerce-which
would include navigable waters-and those involving "activi-
ties" that "substantially affect" interstate commerce, which do
not necessarily involve navigable waters. Accordingly, the
"substantially affects" requirement of the Commerce Clause
apparently applies only to "activities" in navigable waters,
but not to the "channels" of interstate commerce, such as
navigable waters. Thus, the Court's own described methodol-
ogy appears to recognize that Commerce Clause analysis is
different depending on whether "channels" or "activities" are
involved, which suggests that the analysis differs in cases in-
volving the federal navigation power.
This conclusion, however, is not unequivocal. The Su-
preme Court on occasion has suggested that the federal power
to regulate navigation should be viewed in traditional Com-
merce Clause terms, thus suggesting that the same constitu-
tional analysis applies in both types of cases. In Gerlach, the
Court relied on traditional constitutional principles-the
General Welfare Clause rather than the Commerce Clause-
rather than navigability as the basis for upholding the federal
government's reclamation program.'47  In Federal Power
Commission v. Union Electric Co.,'48 the Court appeared to
rely on the federal government's general commerce powers
rather than its navigation powers in upholding the Federal
Power Commission's jurisdiction to regulate non-navigable
waters used to generate electricity for transmission across
state lines.' In Sporhase v. Nebraska,5 ° a dormant Com-
merce Clause case, the Court held that water is an article of
"commerce" within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, and
therefore the right to transfer water in interstate commerce is
146. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
147. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
148. 381 U.S. 90 (1965).
149. See supra note 138.
150. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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governed by traditional Commerce Clause principles. And in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,15' Justice Rehnquist wrote on
behalf of the Court that
[rieference to the navigability of a waterway adds little if
anything to the breadth of Congress' regulatory power
over interstate commerce .... [A] wide spectrum of eco-
nomic activities "affect" interstate commerce and thus are
susceptible of congressional regulation under the Com-
merce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, in-
deed, water, is involved. The cases that discuss Congress'
paramount authority to regulate waters used in interstate
commerce are consequently best understood when viewed
in terms of more traditional Commerce Clause analysis
than by reference to whether the stream in fact is capable
of supporting navigation or may be characterized as
"navigable water of the United States."152
Justice Rehnquist supported this observation by citing the
Appalachian Power case, which he construed as indicating
that "congressional authority over the waters of this Nation
does not depend on a stream's 'navigability.""5 In Appala-
chian Power, however, the Court upheld the Federal Power
Commission's authority to issue a power license on grounds
that the waters were navigable-even though it said the li-
cense could be issued for purposes other than navigation.'
Thus, the Court in past cases appears to have held that navi-
gability is the constitutional touchstone in determining
whether the federal government has the right to regulate wa-
ter, even though such regulation may extend beyond naviga-
tion. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Kaiser Aetna
analyzed the federal regulatory power in terms of whether
the waters had some link with navigability. 5 The distinction
151. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
152. Id. at 173-74. Justice Rehnquist also cited traditional Commerce Clause
cases in support of his conclusion, specifically NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See Kai-
ser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174. These cases, however, did not involve navigation or
water regulation issues.
153. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174.
154. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
155. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175-79. The Kaiser Aetna Court determined
that the federal navigation power did not apply in that case because the regu-
lated activity did not have an adequate nexus to navigation or navigability, and
hence the property owner was entitled to assert a claim for an unconstitutional
taking of property under the Takings Clause of the Constitution.
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between navigable and non-navigable waters for Commerce
Clause purposes may be, as Justice Jackson wrote for the
Court in Gerlach, "highly fictional,""6 but it is a distinction
that the Court has commonly invoked and never directly re-
pudiated.
C. The Clean Water Act & SWANCC
The article will now examine the constitutional basis of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),117 and how the Supreme Court
in SWANCC interpreted that basis. The CWA establishes a
federal pollution control program for the nation's waterways
that is even further removed from the navigation concept
than the Reclamation and Power Acts described above. The
CWA's broad goal is to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,""5
which is to be achieved by developing a "comprehensive long-
range policy for the elimination of water pollution." 59 Thus,
the CWA's goals are unrelated to navigation. Nonetheless,
the CWA primarily applies only to navigable waters. Its spe-
cific goal is to eliminate discharge of pollutants into "naviga-
ble waters" by a certain date. 6' Under section 301, no one
may discharge pollutants into "navigable waters" except as
authorized by the act.' Such authorization is mainly pro-
vided in two major programs: (1) the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System ("NPDES") established in section
402,1 6 which prohibits the discharge of a pollutant from a
point source into "navigable waters" without a permit issued
by the Environmental Protection Agency, and (2) section
404,168 which prohibits the discharge of any dredged or fill ma-
156. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737 (1950).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
158. Id. § 1251(a).
159. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 95 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, Ser. No. 93-1, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1511 (1971). See also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 179 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
160. The year specifically targeted was 1985. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)
(2001).
161. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2001) (prohibiting "discharge of any pollutant"
without authorization). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2001) (defining "dis-
charge of a pollutant" as addition of pollutant to "navigable waters" from point
source).
162. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4)-(b) (2001).
163. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001).
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terials into "navigable waters" without a permit issued by the
Army Corps of Engineers.' Thus, both the prohibitions and
authorizations of the CWA apply to "navigable waters." The
CWA therefore is reminiscent of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899, which described federal jurisdiction in terms of navi-
gability.' Unlike the 1899 act, however, the CWA's purpose
is not to protect navigation. Indeed, there is no inherent link
between eliminating water pollution and protecting navigabil-
ity.
The term "navigable waters" is defined in the CWA as
"waters of the United States."'66 Thus, "navigable" waters are
defined, paradoxically, without using the modifier "naviga-
ble." The legislative history provides an explanation for the
apparent contradiction. Both the House of Representatives
and Senate versions of the original bills defined "navigable
waters" in terms of navigability, but the reference to naviga-
bility was dropped by the Conference Committee in order to
ensure that the phrase "navigable waters" was "given the
broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered
by agency determinations which have been made or may be
made for administrative purposes."167 Thus, Congress evi-
164. Under section 303, the states are mandated to establish water quality
standards subject to the Environmental Protection Agency's approval. See 33
U.S.C. § 1313 (2001). Although some of these water quality standards apply
only to "navigable waters," others, such as standards for "total maximum daily
loads," apply to "waters within its [the State's] boundaries." Id. at § 1313(c)-(d).
165. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
166. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2001). The Ninth Circuit, distinguishing SWANCC,
recently held that "waters of the United States," as used in the CWA and ap-
plied to the NPDES permit program, include irrigation canals and other waters
that are used to "exchange" water with navigable waterways, because such wa-
ters flow "intermittently" into navigable waters. See Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent
Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533-34 (9th Cir. 2001). On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit, relying on SWANCC, recently held that the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., which contains the same "navigable waters"
definitions as found in the CWA, does not apply to discharges of pollutants into
"intermittent" underground streams, where there was no showing that the in-
termittent underground streams were directly linked to surface navigable wa-
ters. See Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
167. See S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1971). The Conference Committee ac-
cepted the version of the House Committee on Public Works, which had deleted
the word "navigable" from the definition of "waters of the United States," and
rejected the version of the Senate Committee on Public Works, which had in-
cluded the word "navigable" in the definition. See William Funk, The Court, the
Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP
10741, 10748 (2001). Representative John Dingell, explaining the reasons for
the Conference Committee version, stated, "The new and broader definition is in
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dently believed that its original definition-which contained
the word "navigable"-might be construed as limiting the ju-
risdiction of federal agencies to less than what the Supreme
Court had recognized in the past or might recognize in the fu-
ture. As noted above, the Supreme Court has broadly con-
strued the federal navigation power to extend, for example, to
waters that are "susceptible" to navigation rather than actu-
ally navigable, to non-navigable tributaries, and even to fed-
eral objectives unrelated to navigation itself.'68 Thus, Con-
gress meant to ensure that the courts, in construing the
CWA, would not reduce its scope to less than what the courts
had already decided regarding the scope of the federal navi-
gation power. It is doubtful that Congress meant to wholly
disregard the "navigable waters" limitation on the Corps' au-
thority under section 404, for otherwise it would have deleted
that limitation.
Two important consequences flow from this legislative
history. First, Congress evidently believed that it was con-
strained by the limits of the federal navigation power in en-
acting the CWA, and that these limits were somehow relevant
in defining the statutory terms of the CWA. Second, Con-
gress intended that the limits of the federal navigation power
would be construed broadly by the courts; Congress itself did
not want to define these limits for fear of defining them too
narrowly. In other words, the federal navigation power is
relevant in determining the scope of the CWA, but that power
is to be interpreted broadly rather than narrowly.
Based on this explanation of the legislative purpose, the
SWANCC majority opinion appears correct in holding that
section 404 limits the Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction
to waters that are navigable or at least linked with navigabil-
ity.'69 That is, the legislative history indicates that navigabil-
ity-although to be defined broadly-nonetheless provides
the touchstone for the Corps' jurisdiction under section 404.
line with more recent judicial opinions which have substantially expanded that
limited view of navigability-derived from the Daniel Ball case-to include wa-
terways which would be 'susceptible of being used.., with reasonable im-
provement' ..... " HOUSE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE, compiled in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, Ser. No. 93-1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 250-51
(1973).
168. See supra notes 99-102, 131-38 and accompanying text.
169. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166-74.
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The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, appears incorrect
in arguing that-since the definitional provision in section
502(7) does not include the word "navigable"-the Corps' ju-
risdiction under section 404 should not be limited to "naviga-
ble" waters. 70 The dissenting opinion appears inconsistent
with Congress's intent that the navigation power, however
defined, has relevance in measuring the Corps' authority un-
der section 404. Indeed, the dissenting view would simply
disregard the word "navigable" in section 404 altogether, thus
reading out of the statute one of the specific terms limiting
the Corps' jurisdiction. The majority opinion, on the other
hand, by tying the Corps' jurisdiction to the "navigable wa-
ters" limitation appearing in section 404, gives meaning to
this limitation and thus more faithfully construes the appar-
ent will of Congress.
Turning to the constitutional question that SWANCC did
not reach-but that guided its statutory analysis-the major-
ity opinion appears to more closely follow the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the federal government's
power to regulate the nation's waters under its commerce
powers. The majority opinion concluded that since the migra-
tory bird rule has no nexus to navigability, the rule "alters
the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroach-
ment upon a traditional state power," thus raising "signifi-
cant constitutional and federalism questions."'7 ' Since the
Supreme Court has historically held that the federal naviga-
tion power is necessary to sustain federal regulation of water,
the majority opinion correctly concluded that the migratory
bird rule raises significant constitutional questions, assum-
ing, of course, the continuing viability of the Court's prece-
dents relating to the navigation power.
The SWANCC dissenting opinion, on the other hand, ar-
gued that the migratory bird rule raised no constitutional is-
sues relating to the federal navigation power.12 According to
the dissenting opinion, the provision in section 404 restricting
the Army Corps of Engineers' authority to "navigable waters"
derived from a similar restriction in the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, and the latter act was adopted when "Congress's
170. See id. at 174-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 173-74.
172. See id. at 174-97.
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power over the Nation's waters was viewed as extending only
to 'water bodies that were deemed "navigable" and therefore
suitable for moving goods to or from markets.""73 The dissent-
ing opinion errs in suggesting that the Court has rejected
navigability as a measure of federal jurisdiction to regulate
water. On the contrary, the Court's jurisprudence, as re-
flected in Appalachian Power and other cases, indicates that
navigability continues to be a major constitutional touch-
stone, although, as noted above, this conclusion is not alto-
gether free from doubt.'74 Therefore, the dissenting opinion's
argument that navigability does not matter is one that, to
date, the Court has not accepted. Although the Court has
substantially broadened the navigable waters doctrine-by
holding that the federal government can regulate navigable
waters even for non-navigation purposes-the Court has
never directly repudiated the doctrine itself. Even though the
dissenting opinion described the navigable waters doctrine as
"odd" -- just as Justice Jackson in Gerlach regarded it as
"fictional""' 6-the doctrine is deeply rooted in the Court's ju-
risprudence and appears extant. Indeed, the fact that a ma-
jority of the SWANCC Justices believed that the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over non-navigable waters "alters the fed-
eral-state framework by permitting federal encroachment
upon a traditional state power" indicates that the majority
continues to believe in the viability of the navigable waters
doctrine.
D. Comment on the Federal Navigation Power
The navigable waters doctrine is both a source of federal
power and a limitation on such power in that it authorizes the
federal government to regulate essentially national interests
173. Id. at 181-82. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion also ar-
gued that these earlier statutes "had the primary purpose of protecting naviga-
tion," while the CWA's goals "have nothing to do with navigation at all." Id.
(emphasis in original). The dissenting opinion appears incorrect in stating that
these earlier acts had the "primary" purpose of protecting navigation; although
that was true of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, it was not true of the
Power Act, which, according to Appalachian Power, was adopted primarily for
power purposes rather than navigation purposes. See United States v. Appala-
chian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424, 426, 427 (1940).
174. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
175. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. See supra note 156.
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in navigable waters but precludes federal regulation of essen-
tially local interests in non-navigable waters. Thus, the doc-
trine assumes that the federal commerce power, in the con-
text of water regulation, applies only to waters that are
navigable, or at least have a nexus to navigability. The doc-
trine is somewhat incongruent with the Supreme Court's
modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which holds that
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce depends on
whether the regulated activity "substantially affects" inter-
state commerce and that "commerce" refers to economic
rather than non-economic activity.' Certainly an activity oc-
curring in a waterway, hypothetically, may "substantially af-
fect" interstate economic interests, even though the waters
are not navigable and have no nexus with navigability. Thus,
the federal government may be unable to regulate activities
in navigable waters under its navigation power, even though
a different conclusion would result under traditional Com-
merce Clause analysis.
As Justice Stevens observed in his SWANCC dissenting
opinion, the navigable waters doctrine is the product of an
earlier age of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, when the
states were regarded as having virtually unlimited sovereign
authority over their water resources subject only to the fed-
eral power to regulate navigation.'78 The Supreme Court has
overturned much of its earlier Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence limiting the federal regulatory role. For example, in
Geer v. Connecticut,'79 decided in 1896, the Court held that
the states "own" their wildlife resources and therefore that
regulation of such resources falls within the exclusive prov-
ince of the states; in Hughes v. Oklahoma,8 ° decided in 1979,
the Court overturned Geer and ruled that the federal gov-
ernment may regulate wildlife resources under its commerce
power. The Supreme Court, however, has never overturned
its jurisprudence regarding the federal navigation power, ei-
ther as a source of or limitation on federal power. Indeed, a
majority of the SWANCC Justices appeared to believe that
the navigable waters jurisprudence remains valid. This ju-
risprudence brings to mind Justice Holmes' observation that
177. See supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
178. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 178-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
180. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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the life of the law has been experience rather than logic.'81
The navigable waters doctrine appears to have some
value in defining the federal and state regulatory roles in our
constitutional federalism. The doctrine recognizes that the
states have traditionally regulated their water resources-
subject, of course, to the federal navigation power-and that
such traditional state regulation is based upon the United
States' earliest constitutional foundations. If the doctrine did
not exist, water would simply be one avenue of commerce
that, for Commerce Clause purposes, is indistinguishable
from other avenues of commerce, such as railroads, highways,
and so forth. In that event, Commerce Clause analysis would
afford no special weight or significance to the states' tradi-
tional authority to regulate their water resources; instead,
the same constitutional analysis would apply irrespective of
the avenue of commerce. As long as the states are regarded
as having uniquely sovereign interests in regulating their wa-
ter resources, there is some value in a constitutional doctrine
that affords special recognition of these traditional state in-
terests.
Nonetheless, a strict application of the navigable waters
doctrine may make it difficult for the federal government to
regulate truly national matters in the water context, thus
undermining the foundations of the Commerce Clause itself.
For example, the federal government has an important inter-
est in reclaiming the West's arid lands and in promoting the
development of hydroelectric power in the nation's water-
ways, interests that were sustained in Gerlach and Appala-
chian Power. If the federal government lacked authority to
regulate navigable waters for purposes other than navigation,
or if it lacked authority to regulate non-navigable waters no
matter how compelling the national interest, the government
would have lacked authority to adopt the reclamation and
power programs that were sustained in Gerlach and Appala-
chian Power. The Court in those cases instead sustained the
federal regulatory power by holding that such power extends
beyond the protection of navigation, and perhaps can even be
justified under general welfare powers that resemble a police
power.'82 However important the national programs sus-
181. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
182. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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tained by those decisions, the rationale of those decisions ap-
parently would allow the federal government to exercise ple-
nary authority over navigable waters for any purpose-and
perhaps even police power authority over all waters-and
thus would fundamentally alter the federal-state balance by
changing the navigable waters doctrine to the point where it
no longer serves its underlying purpose. These decisions, of
course, were rendered during the post-New Deal era, when
the Supreme Court viewed the federal commerce power as
having virtually no limits, and are divergent from the Su-
preme Court's recent decisions in Lopez and Morrison, which
have adopted a more modest view of the federal commerce
power.
The navigable waters doctrine can be more closely inte-
grated into the Supreme Court's traditional Commerce
Clause jurisprudence in a way that allows the federal gov-
ernment to regulate what is truly national and preserves the
states' authority to regulate what is essentially local. Under
this integration, the navigable waters doctrine should not be
regarded as establishing an absolute rule that the federal
government has power to regulate navigable waters and lacks
power to regulate non-navigable waters, but instead should
be regarded as establishing only a presumption that the fed-
eral government has, or does not have, such powers. This
presumption, of course, could be overcome by a showing that
activities in non-navigable waters indeed have interstate ef-
fects. This presumption is consistent with the underlying
tenet of the navigable waters doctrine, which historically was
based on the assumption that the distinction between navi-
gable and non-navigable waters comported with the distinc-
tion between interstate and local interests.
Several factors seem relevant in determining whether the
presumption that the federal government cannot regulate
non-navigable waters is overcome in individual cases. The
most important factor is whether the federal regulation pro-
tects navigation interests (or related interests such as flood
control or river management) rather than other interests. If
the regulation protects navigation or like interests, the regu-
lation is valid per se; although navigation interests may not
be the most important in the arsenal of federal interests, they
are at the core of the federal power to regulate water. An-
other factor-assuming that navigation interests are not
739
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mainly involved-would be the nature and importance of the
government interest. The courts commonly consider this
qualitative factor in determining the scope of other federal
constitutional powers; for example, the constitutionality of
government regulation under the Due Process Clause, the
Takings Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Con-
stitution 8' depends, in part, on the nature and importance of
the government interest as balanced against other relevant
interests.'84 This qualitative factor seems equally relevant in
balancing the federal commerce power to regulate water
against the states' traditional authority to regulate water un-
der equal footing principles. Another factor would be whether
the regulation was adopted directly by Congress, as in the
case of the reclamation and power programs involved in Ger-
lach and Appalachian Power, or whether the regulation in-
stead was adopted by an administrative agency without spe-
cific congressional direction, such as the migratory bird rule
involved in SWANCC. Direct regulation by Congress is more
likely to implicate national interests than administrative
rulemaking. Indeed, the Supreme Court has distinguished
between congressional directives and administrative actions
in determining the validity of state laws in other federal-state
water contexts. 8' Other factors would be those that the Su-
preme Court has applied, as in Lopez and Morrison, to deter-
mine whether the federal government has properly exercised
its general commerce powers-for example, whether the regu-
lated activities affect economic rather than non-economic in-
terests,186 whether the states have traditionally regulated the
subject matter,'87 and whether Congress has adopted findings
that apply constitutionally-permissible standards.'88 The dif-
ference is that in determining whether the federal govern-
ment has properly exercised its commerce power in the con-
183. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
184. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Due Process
Clause); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (Takings Clause); Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (Equal Protection Clause).
185. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (holding that "con-
gressional directives" adopted pursuant to Reclamation Act of 1902 override
state water laws, but that administrative actions in the absence of such con-
gressional directives do not).
186. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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text of water regulation, the analysis would start with the
presumption that navigable waters are tied to national inter-
ests and non-navigable waters to local interests, a presump-
tion that underlies the entire navigable waters doctrine. This
approach, by establishing a presumption rather than an abso-
lute rule, allows protection of truly national interests while
preserving the states' historic authority to regulate water for
local purposes. This approach, for example, would have al-
lowed Congress's reclamation and power programs to be sus-
tained on a less fictitious basis than was employed in Appala-
chian Power and Gerlach.
It is less likely, however, that the migratory bird rule at
issue in SWANCC would survive this kind of inquiry. The
rule was not adopted pursuant to the federal navigation
power, and did not apply to navigation or like interests; in-
deed, the rule applied irrespective of whether the regulated
waters were navigable or had any reasonable nexus with
navigability. Additionally, the rule did not substantially af-
fect interstate "commerce," because migratory birds generally
have no effect on economic interests among the states. Also,
the rule did not appear to be an important component of Con-
gress's program to control water pollution; rather, the rule
was adopted administratively-and only as a "clarification"-
rather than as a direct part of Congress's regulatory program.
Further, the rule was not supported by any administrative
findings-much less congressional findings-indicating that
the states were inadequately regulating wetlands and other
areas frequented by migratory birds; although such findings
are not conclusive in supporting the federal power, their ab-
sence undermines its necessity. Finally, the federal govern-
ment has alternative constitutional powers, particularly the
treaty power,"' that allows federal protection of migratory
birds in some circumstances if state regulation is deemed in-
adequate. For example, in Missouri v. Holland,90 the Su-
preme Court upheld the constitutionality of a migratory bird
treaty between the United States and Canada that overrode
conflicting state laws, even though, the Court said, Congress
could not have adopted the regulation under its commerce
189. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
190. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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powers.' Thus, the migratory bird rule, as an exercise of
Congress's commerce and navigation powers, does not stand
on the same footing as the reclamation and power programs
involved in Gerlach and Appalachian Power.
Therefore, the navigable waters doctrine can be inte-
grated into traditional Commerce Clause analysis in a way
that allows the federal government to regulate water for truly
national purposes and retains the states' authority to regu-
late waters for essentially local purposes. As long as such in-
tegration is possible, there is no basis for concluding that the
navigable waters doctrine fails to serve the national interest
and should be overturned.
V. EFFECT OF LOPEZ, MORRISON AND SWANCC ON FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
A. Effect of Lopez and Morrison
The Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez, Morrison and
SWANCC may have a major impact on the constitutionality
of Congress's environmental laws. In particular, Lopez and
Morrison held that the federal commerce power applies only
to activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.'92
Congress's environmental laws, on the other hand, generally
have non-economic goals as their primary purposes, such as
protecting and enhancing water quality, preserving and im-
proving air quality, and preserving endangered species from
extinction.'93 These congressional enactments often signifi-
cantly restrict the use of private lands, thus diminishing the
states' traditional authority to regulate land use.' Since Lo-
pez and Morrison limit the federal commerce power in cases
involving non-economic regulation and in matters tradition-
ally regulated by the states, these decisions raise significant
191. See id. at 435.
192. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
193. Some major environmental laws that may be affected by Lopez and Mor-
rison are the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
74 01-7671q, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44, and the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75.
194. For example, the Endangered Species Act's prohibition against a taking
of endangered species allows federal restrictions on land use activities affecting
endangered species habitats. See 16 U.S.C § 1538(a)(1)(B); Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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questions whether Congress's environmental laws fall outside
the Commerce Clause ambit.
195
Certainly Lopez and Morrison raise questions concerning
the validity, or at least rationale, of the Supreme Court's only
decision that addresses the validity of federal environmental
laws under the Commerce Clause. In Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,196 decided in 1981, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"),'97 which regulated sur-
face coal mining operations. The purpose of SMCRA, accord-
ing to its provisions, was to establish a "nationwide program
to protect society and the environment from the adverse ef-
fects of surface coal mining operations."' Thus, the statutory
purpose involved environmental and social needs, not com-
mercial ones. SMCRA imposed several performance stan-
dards for surface coal mining operations, including a re-
quirement that lands used for coal mining purposes must be
restored to their prior condition after the mining operations
were completed.'99 The Supreme Court held that the statute
was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce powers even
though it was adopted primarily for environmental and social
purposes. Describing the federal commerce power in sweep-
ing terms, the Court stated that Congress may regulate ac-
tivities "causing air or water pollution, or other environ-
mental hazards that may have effects in more than one
State."0 ° The Court also held that it must defer to congres-
sional findings relating to an exercise of the commerce power
if the findings are supported by a rational basis, and held
that Congress's findings that surface coal mining has inter-
195. For a general discussion of this issue, see W. Funk, supra note 167 at
10765-71; Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Results for All the Wrong
Reasons: An Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 52
VAND. L. REV. 271 (2000); David A. Linehan, Note, Endangered Regulation:
Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be Suitable Habitat for Endangered
Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 365 (1998); J. Blanding
Holman, IV, Note, After United States v. Lopez: Can the Clean Water Act and
the Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 139 (1995).
196. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
197. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328.
198. Id. at § 1202(a). See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268.
199. See SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328.
200. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282.
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state effects are supported by a rational basis.21' The Court
also reasoned that SMCRA was necessary to prevent the kind
of "destructive interstate competition" that would result if one
state were allowed to establish lower coal mining standards
than other states,2 ' which, in effect, would create a "race to
the bottom" among the states in order to encourage the loca-
tion of coal mining operations in their respective states.
Thus, the Hodel Court appeared to suggest that Congress has
virtually unlimited authority to regulate environmental mat-
ters under its commerce powers, as long as Congress deter-
mines that such regulation is necessary for valid environ-
mental and social purposes.
Although Hodel is consistent with the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause analysis during the post-New Deal period,
it appears inconsistent with the rationale in Lopez and Morri-
son. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that that the
Commerce Clause applies only to activities that "substan-
tially affect" interstate economic interests,"°' contrary to Ho-
del's holding that Congress has virtually unfettered authority
to regulate environmental activities having little or no eco-
nomic consequences."°4 In Lopez and Morrison, the Court held
that deference cannot be accorded to congressional findings
that a particular activity affects interstate commerce, unless
the findings apply a constitutionally permissible standard in
evaluating such effects."°' This is contrary to Hodel's conclu-
sion that deference must be accorded to congressional find-
ings under a "rational basis" standard of review. Further,
Hodel's reasoning that uniform national standards are neces-
201. See id. at 276. The Court noted that the congressional findings relating
to SMCRA stated that many surface operations
result in disturbances of surface areas that burden and adversely af-
fect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing the
utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, ag-
ricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by
contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and
wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the prop-
erty of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous to life and property by
degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counteract-
ing governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and
other natural resources.
Id. at 277 (quoting from section 101(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c)).
202. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281-82.
203. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
204. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281-82.
205. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-16 (2000).
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sary to avoid "destructive interstate competition" suggests
that the states are incapable of adequately regulating a sub-
ject matter that they have traditionally regulated, which is
contrary to Lopez's and Morrison's conclusion that some def-
erence should be accorded to traditional state regulation.
Thus, Lopez and Morrison suggest a much more rigorous ju-
dicial scrutiny of congressional environmental legislation
than Hodel.
Nonetheless, many of Congress's environmental laws ap-
pear, at least on their face, to have a sufficient connection to
interstate economic interests to be sustained under the fed-
eral commerce power. The Commerce Clause, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, does not require that the law's pri-
mary purpose be to regulate economic activity, or even that
the regulated activity be of an economic nature; rather, it re-
quires only that the regulated activity-whatever its na-
ture-"substantially affect" interstate economic interests. °6
Thus, although the Commerce Clause literally authorizes
Congress only to "regulate Commerce," the Supreme Court
has held that Congress may regulate activities substantially
affecting commerce, which is one step removed from com-
merce itself. Much federal environmental legislation appears
to facially meet this somewhat looser standard. The CWA
and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), °7 for example, although pri-
marily directed toward environmental protection, nonetheless
regulate activities that may have significant economic inter-
state effects. Indeed, the catalyst for the CWA was a fire in
Ohio's Cuyahoga River caused by oil pollution that destroyed
ships and other property.28 Further, the effects of water pol-
lution can cross state lines, most obviously where the waters
themselves cross state lines. 9 Similarly, the CAA pursues
air quality goals that may affect economic interests crossing
state lines; dirty air emitted from a factory in one state can
easily cross into another state, causing serious public health
206. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
207. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401. See generally Hancock v. Train,
426 U.S. 167 (1976).
208. See SWANCC v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally California v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
426 U.S. 200 (1976).
209. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (discussing water
pollution crossing state lines); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931)
(discussing water pollution crossing state lines).
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damage and resulting in a loss of economic productivity in
both states."O Moreover, many federal environmental laws
provide for significant state regulatory responsibilities, thus
limiting the extent to which such laws intrude into traditional
state regulatory functions. The CWA, for example, declares
that the states have the "primary responsibilities and rights"
to eliminate water pollution,2 1' and provides that the states
have primary authority for administering major programs
adopted under the act, such as the NPDES permit program
authorized in section 402.212 Therefore, the CWA and CAA, as
well as other federal programs modeled after them, appear
facially to pass constitutional muster even after Lopez and
Morrison.13
Although Congress's environmental laws may be facially
constitutional, they may, of course, be unconstitutional as ap-
plied in individual circumstances.1 In SWANCC itself, the
Supreme Court held that the migratory bird rule promul-
210. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (air pollution
crossing state lines).
211. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
212. See id. § 1342(b).
213. Several federal courts have sustained Congress's environmental laws
against Commerce Clause challenges subsequent to Lopez and, in some cases,
subsequent to Morrison as well. Indeed, no decision to date has invalidated an
environmental law under the Commerce Clause. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d
483 (4th Cir. 2000) (sustaining federal regulation under Endangered Species
Act prohibiting "take" of reintroduced red wolves); National Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (sustaining "take" provision
of Endangered Species Act as applied to fly species); United States v. Olin
Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding constitutionality of retroactive
liability under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-
ability Act); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (sustaining
Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir.
1997) (sustaining federal regulation under CWA of discharge of pollutants into
public sewers); United States v. Lundquist, 932 F.Supp. 1237, 1245 (D. Or.
1996) (sustaining Eagle Protection Act); United States v. Romano, 929 F.Supp.
502, 507-09 (D. Mass. 1996) (sustaining Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78, which
prohibits marketing in interstate commerce of fish and wildlife in violation of
state law). See also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (pre-Lopez/Morrison case sustaining federal regulation
prohibiting state from adversely modifying endangered species habitat by main-
taining sheep and goat populations).
214. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687,
709 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the validity of federal regu-
lation prohibiting habitat modification under the Endangered Species Act de-
pends on "proximate cause" in terms of whether the habitat modification "fore-
seeably" affects endangered species); id. at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that statutes may be invalidated "as applied" even though facially valid).
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gated under authority of the CWA raised constitutional diffi-
culties, even though the Court did not suggest that the CWA
itself raised such difficulties. Moreover, the migratory bird
rule likely would have been constitutionally sustained if ap-
plied to traditionally navigable waters. By narrowly constru-
ing the CWA's statutory scope to avoid constitutional ques-
tions, SWANCC likely ensures that the CWA itself passes
constitutional muster.
The Endangered Species Act ("ESA") presents more diffi-
cult constitutional questions, both facially and as applied, be-
cause the ESA appears to have a more tenuous connection to
interstate commerce than other environmental laws, such as
the CWA and the CAA. The ESA, according to its terms, was
enacted to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved."215 Thus, the ESA makes no mention of
any commercial purpose."6 Moreover, although dirty water
and dirty air can affect public health and economic productiv-
ity in different states, the loss of endangered species is less
likely to have such interstate economic effects, particularly
where the species is located in a single state and, by defini-
tion, is nearly extinct and therefore less likely to be connected
with resources or activities in other states. Further, the ESA
authorizes the imposition of several kinds of land use restric-
tions in order to protect endangered species, thus diminishing
the states' traditional authority to regulate land use. For ex-
ample, the ESA authorizes lands to be set aside as "critical
habitat" for endangered species," ' and authorizes the creation
of conservation plans that limit land use in areas where such
species are found.218 In addition, the ESA makes it unlawful
to "take"-meaning "harm"-an endangered species, 219
federal regulation provides that "harm" includes "significant
habitat modification" that may adversely affect "essential be-
havioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or shelter-
215. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
216. The ESA, however, prohibits certain kinds of commercial activities, such
as the importation of endangered species into the United States, the shipment
in interstate or foreign commerce of such species, and the sale or offering of sale
of such species in interstate or foreign commerce. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(E)-
(F).
217. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
218. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2).
219. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) ("take"); id. § 1532(19) ("harm").
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ing." "' Thus, the ESA significantly restricts land use in order
to protect endangered species whose effects on interstate
commerce are, at most, marginal.
To date, all federal court decisions, some of which were
decided after Lopez and Morrison, have upheld the ESA and
actions thereunder against Commerce Clause challenges, al-
though some have inspired vigorous dissents.221 Nonetheless,
the rationale of some of these decisions may be inconsistent
with the reasoning of Lopez and Morrison, which raises ques-
tions whether some federal actions pursuant to the ESA may
be constitutionally sustained. This is not to suggest that the
Supreme Court should, or should not, sustain the rationale of
these lower court decisions as a proper explication of Con-
gress's commerce powers; the point simply is that the ration-
ale of these decisions may not be wholly congruent with Lopez
and Morrison. Closer examination of a pair of the decisions
will illustrate this point.
In National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt
("NAHB), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit upheld the Secretary of the Interior's authority to
prevent a county in California from expanding a freeway in-
tersection in order to provide access to emergency hospital
emergency vehicles. The court reasoned that the Secretary
had properly determined that the freeway intersection expan-
sion would harm a small colony of flies-the Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly-that had been designated as "endan-
gered" under the ESA. The court concluded, in a two-to-one
decision, that the case was distinguishable from Lopez and
Morrison because there was a reasonable nexus between the
Secretary's regulation protecting the flies and interstate
commerce.2 First, the elimination of some or all endangered
species would adversely affect "biodiversity," and thereby
prevent such species from being developed to produce mar-
ketable products, such as those used for medicines and
genes.224 It is "not beyond the realm of possibility," the opin-
ion stated, that the fly might someday inbreed with the hon-
220. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).
221. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
222. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
223. See id. (Judge Wald wrote the main opinion, Judge Henderson wrote a
concurring opinion, and Judge Sentelle wrote a dissenting opinion).
224. See id. at 1052.
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eybee, thus producing a pollinator that is "more disease resis-
tant."225 In addition, the opinion stated, protection of the flies
was necessary to prevent the kind of "destructive interstate
competition" that would result if one state adopted less pro-
tective regulatory standards than other states.226 The opinion
also relied on the aggregation principle established in
Wickard, stating that it was appropriate to aggregate minor
incidents in order to conclude that such incidents, collectively,
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.227 Finally,
the opinion relied on the Supreme Court's earlier statement
in Hodel that Congress may constitutionally regulate activi-
ties "causing air or water pollution, or other environmental
hazards that may have effects in more than one State."228 The
dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argued that the Secre-
tary's regulation protecting the fly colony had no effect on in-
terstate commerce and interfered with the traditional author-
ity of state and local governments to regulate land use.229
In another case, Gibbs v. Babbitt,"' the Fourth Circuit, in
another two-to-one decision, upheld a regulation adopted by
the Secretary of the Interior that experimentally reintroduced
an endangered species, the red wolf, into North Carolina and
Tennessee. The regulation prevented anyone from "taking,"
or harming, the reintroduced wolves. The Secretary's regula-
tion was challenged by private landowners who, wanting to
protect their cattle from the predatory animals, argued that
the Secretary's regulation exceeded the commerce power. Re-
jecting their argument, the majority held that the case was
distinguishable from Lopez and Morrison because the Secre-
tary's regulation was reasonably related to interstate com-
merce."' According to the court, the protection of the wolves
had several distinctly economic effects of an interstate na-
ture-such protection created a recreational industry that en-
couraged tourism and interstate travel, provided the basis for
scientific research that generates jobs, and created the possi-
225. Id. at 1053.
226. See id. at 1054 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).
227. See id. at 1049.
228. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282.
229. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1060 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
230. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
231. See id. at 492-98.
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bility of renewed trade in fur pelts.232 The court also applied
Wickard's aggregation principle, holding that although the
taking of an individual wolf would have minor interstate con-
sequences, the entire class of activity regulated by the Secre-
tary, taken as a whole, would have significant conse-
quences.233 Finally, the court stated that federal regulation of
the wolves does not intrude into areas traditionally regulated
by the states, because the Supreme Court had ruled that
Congress has authority to regulate wildlife under its com-
merce powers notwithstanding claims that the states "own"
such resources.234 More broadly, the court stated that the
ESA was based on need for uniform national standards gov-
erning the protection of endangered species, and that to defer
to state regulation would "throw into question much federal
environmental legislation" and would lead to "conflicting obli-
gations" on businesses engaged in interstate activities.235 The
dissenting opinion, on the other hand, argued that the taking
of red wolves did not constitute an economic activity, much
less one having effects in other states.36
The majority opinions in NAHB and Gibbs do not appear
to be consistent with the reasoning in Lopez and Morrison.
As noted earlier, Lopez and Morrison held that the connection
between gun possession near schools and gender-based vio-
lence, on the one hand, and national economic productivity,
on the other, was too tenuous to provide a basis for Commerce
Clause regulation. By the same token, the connection be-
tween red wolves and a local fly colony on the one hand, and
interstate commerce on the other, would appear at least
equally tenuous; in particular, the regulation of the singular
fly colony in NAHB appears to have much less connection to
interstate commerce than the activities involved in Lopez and
Morrison. Moreover, Gibbs's reliance on certain e~onomic
consequences resulting from red wolf regulation-tourism,
scientific research, and commercial pelt trade-suggests that
the Secretary may lack authority to protect endangered spe-
cies where these consequences are not present. Certainly the
232. See id. at 492-95.
233. See id. at 497-98.
234. See id. at 502 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)). See
also supra note 180.
235. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502.
236. See id. at 506 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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fly colony involved in NAHB had no effect on tourism or trade
and little effect on scientific research. Thus, Gibbs itself may
not be altogether congruent with NAHB. The Gibbs analysis
suggests that the constitutional basis for ESA regulation may
qualitatively depend on the species that is being regulated, in
terms of whether, for example, tourists are likely to travel to
the venue where the species is located. If so, ESA regulation
may be highly problematic as applied to certain species in
which tourists have little interest and that lack other com-
mercial attributes, such as the Delta smelt that is located in
California's Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, whose protection
by federal agencies under the ESA has substantially affected
allocations of California's water supply.
2 37
Other parts of the NAHB and Gibbs analyses seem even
more divergent from Lopez and Morrison. Although both
NAHB and Gibbs argued that uniform national standards are
necessary for endangered species protection, the constitu-
tional question, as posed in Lopez and Morrison, is whether
the regulated activities substantially affect interstate com-
merce. The need for nationally uniform standards may be
relevant in determining whether Congress has preempted
state laws-assuming, of course, that it has constitutional
power to do so--but, under Lopez and Morrison, is not rele-
vant in determining the scope of Congress's constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce. Moreover, NAHB's
fear that the states might engage in "destructive" regulation
under non-national standards suggests a reluctance to defer
to traditional state regulation that is contrary to Lopez's and
Morrison's admonition that such deference must be constitu-
tionally accorded. Additionally, Gibbs' and NAHB's reliance
on Wickard's aggregation principle appears contrary to Lo-
pez's and Morrison's reluctance to apply this principle in cases
not involving economic regulation. 38 Finally, NAHB's argu-
ment that biodiversity among endangered species has mar-
ketplace implications seems particularly untenable because
endangered species by definition are on the verge of extinc-
tion and thus unlikely to have significant commercial effects.
237. See Letter from U.S. Fish and Wildlife to Regional Director, U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation (Mar. 6, 1995) (on file with author) (discussing the "Formal Con-
sultation and Conference of Effects of Long-Term operation of Central Valley
Project").
238. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, NAHB merely hypothesized that such implications
might occur, thus engaging in speculative analysis of market-
place conditions that is inconsistent with Lopez's and Morri-
son's deference to state regulation.
Still, it is premature to suggest that the Supreme Court,
even after Lopez and Morrison, will invalidate significant por-
tions of the ESA or actions taken thereunder on constitu-
tional grounds. First, the Court may decline to fully apply
the rationale of Lopez and Morrison to environmental cases,
particularly if the Court changes its rationale as its composi-
tion changes. Additionally, the Court, contemporaneously
with Lopez and Morrison, has interpreted and applied the
ESA without suggesting the presence of any constitutional
difficulties."9 For example, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Oregon,4' the Court held that the
ESA's prohibition against the "taking" of an endangered spe-
cies is sufficiently broad to authorize the Secretary of the In-
terior to prohibit adverse modifications of endangered species
habitats.24' Since the Court simply interpreted the statute, it
was not called on to address any constitutional issues. None-
theless, the Court's failure to raise any constitutional ques-
tions on its own may suggest that it perceived no constitu-
tional difficulties. Thus, it is difficult to predict how the
Court will view the ESA and other environmental laws in fu-
ture cases. These questions almost certainly will capture the
Court's future attention.
B. Effect of SWANCC
The effect of SWANCC on administration of the nation's
wetlands will depend on how broadly the decision is con-
strued. Technically, the Supreme Court held only that the
migratory bird rule is invalid. 42 Based on this narrow hold-
239. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that section
7 of ESA precludes completion of federal dam because of predicted impact on
endangered snail darter); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, 515
U.S. 687 (1995) (holding that ESA authorizes federal regulation prohibiting
habitat modification); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (holding that par-
ties asserting economic interests have standing to challenge federal regulations
adopted under ESA).
240. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
241. See supra note 214.
242. See SWANCC v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
"We hold that 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(3) (1999), as clarified and applied to peti-
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ing, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental
Protection Agency have issued a guidance letter declaring
that except where the Corps' jurisdiction is predicated solely
on the migratory bird rule, the Corps' jurisdiction over all
other "waters of the United States" remains intact. The
guidance letter, however, appears to construe SWANCC too
narrowly. Although the Court struck down the migratory
bird rule, it did so because the Corps lacks authority under
the CWA to regulate "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate wa-
ters."2 4  Thus, the Court's decision precludes the Corps from
exercising jurisdiction over waters lacking any nexus with
navigability, not just waters inhabited by migratory birds.
Hence, although Riverside Bayview held that the Corps may
regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable waters,245 SWANCC
holds that the Corps may not regulate wetlands isolated from
such waters. SWANCC thus significantly limits the Corps'
authority to regulate wetlands under the CWA.
246
tioner's balefill site pursuant to the 'Migratory Bird Rule,' 51 Fed. Reg. 41217
(1986), exceeds the authority granted to respondents under § 404(a) of the
CWA." Id. at 173.
243. See Memorandum from G. Guzy, General Counsel, EPA, and R. Ander-
sen, Chief Counsel, Army Corps of Engineers (Jan. 19, 2001) (on file with au-
thor) (discussing the Supreme Court Ruling Concerning CWA Jurisdiction over
Isolated Waters and noting that waters covered by the Corps' regulation that
"could affect interstate commerce solely by virtue of their use as habitat by mi-
gratory birds are no longer considered 'waters of the United States'") (emphasis
in original); Letter from Art Champ, Chief, Regulatory Branch, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Sacramento, California (Mar. 8, 2001) (on file with author)
("The only isolated waters that the Corps of Engineers will not continue to regu-
late are those isolated waters where the only interstate commerce connection is
use by migratory birds.").
On the other hand, the Corps recently withdrew its claim that it has regu-
latory authority over a vernal pool located within a large ranch used for cattle
grazing, although the Corps had asserted jurisdiction over the vernal pool ear-
lier in the case. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Corps had conceded that
SWANCC "precludes Corps' authority over the vernal pool in dispute." Borden
Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001).
244. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 169-73.
245. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985).
246. The Association of State Wetland Managers initially estimated that if
SWANCC is interpreted to allow regulation only of traditionally navigable wa-
ters and adjacent wetlands, only twenty percent of the nation's wetlands would
remain subject to regulation under the CWA, although the percentage would be
substantially higher if the concept of adjacency includes any wetlands within
the 100-year floodplain (thirty to forty percent) and if the CWA extends to tribu-
taries of navigable waters (forty to sixty percent). See W. Funk, supra note 167,
at 10745. According to the association, only fourteen states currently regulate
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Since SWANCC restricts the Corps' jurisdiction over wet-
lands, SWANCC may encourage the states to provide for
more regulation of wetlands under their own laws. Indeed,
SWANCC's stated assumption that the states are responsible
for regulating isolated waters appears to invite the states to
determine whether, and to what extent, they should directly
regulate isolated wetlands. Although a relatively small num-
ber of states currently regulate wetlands,247 this figure may
rise as more states attempt to fill the regulatory vacuum over
isolated wetlands. In California, for example, the Chief
Counsel for the State Water Resources Control Board has
suggested that California's regional water quality control
boards should be authorized to regulate wetlands that are no
longer subject to the Corps' jurisdiction.248
The impact of SWANCC extends beyond the Corps' au-
thority over migratory birds or isolated wetlands. The deci-
sion broadly applies to virtually all of the CWA's regulatory
scheme because the statutory scheme is largely predicated on
regulation of "navigable" waters. The goal of the CWA is to
eliminate discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters," and
this goal is largely accomplished by prohibition of pollutant
discharges into "navigable waters" except where specific au-
thorization is provided; such authorization is provided,
mainly, by the section 402 NPDES program and the section
404 dredge-and-fill program, both of which require permits
for certain kinds of pollutant discharges into "navigable wa-
ters. 2 49 Thus, although SWANCC held only that the Corps
may not regulate isolated waters or migratory birds under
wetlands. See id.
247. See supra note 246.
248. See Letter from Craig Wilson, General Counsel, to State Water Re-
sources Control Board (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author). Under California's
Porter-Cologne Act, no person may "discharge waste" that could affect the "wa-
ters of the State" without obtaining a waste discharge permit from a regional
water quality control board. See CAL. WATER CODE § 13260 (Deering 2001).
The phrase "waters of the State" includes all surface water and groundwater
'within the boundaries of the state." Id. § 13050. Thus, the Porter-Cologne Act,
unlike the CWA, applies to all intrastate waters, including "isolated" waters.
On the other hand, it is not clear whether the Porter-Cologne Act, in prohibiting
unauthorized discharges of "waste," generally applies to activities affecting wet-
lands, which often do not involve "waste." The California Legislature may need
to clarify whether the authority of state agencies extends to all activities in wet-
lands.
249. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
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section 404, its reasoning supports the broader conclusion
that the "navigable waters" limitation appearing in the CWA
must be strictly read to preclude regulation of waters that are
not navigable nor linked with navigability. Therefore, the
provisions of the CWA limiting federal jurisdiction to naviga-
ble waters, particularly the section 402 NPDES program that
is the heart of the CWA, are similarly circumscribed by the
SWANCC decision. Neither the Environmental Protection
Agency nor the Army Corps of Engineers has determined
whether the waters broadly regulated by the CWA fall within
the category of navigable or "nexus"-related waters, aside
from the guidance letter arguing that SWANCC applies only
to the migratory bird rule adopted under section 404. After
SWANCC, the various regulatory programs established under
the CWA may be subject to constitutional and statutory chal-
lenges to the extent they apply to waters without a nexus to
navigability. Therefore, beyond its effect on wetlands,
SWANCC has a potentially large impact on the regulatory
programs established in the CWA.25°
SWANCC may also affect regulation of endangered spe-
cies under the ESA. The ESA regulates all endangered spe-
cies regardless of their habitats, and thus does not distin-
guish between those that inhabit land and those that inhabit
water. Although many endangered species, such as the red
wolves and flies involved in Gibbs and NAHB, primarily in-
habit land, other endangered species, such as fish species in-
volved in past Supreme Court cases, inhabit water."' For en-
250. Paradoxically, the SWANCC decision, by reducing federal regulatory
authority over discharges to non-navigable waters under the CWA, may have
the effect of reducing state regulatory authority over such discharges as well.
Section 401(a) of the CWA provides that any applicant for a federal license or
permit that would authorize discharges into navigable waters must obtain a
certification from state authorities that the discharge will comply with state wa-
ter quality standards adopted under section 303 of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. §
1341(a) (2001). See also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecol-
ogy, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). Since the Army Corps of Engineers lacks authority to
regulate discharges to isolated waters under SWANCC, there is no occasion for
the states to provide water quality certifications for such discharges under sec-
tion 401(a). SWANCC does not, however, diminish the states' authority to regu-
late such discharges under their own laws. Indeed, section 510 of the CWA spe-
cifically preserves the "jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
[including boundary waters] of such States." Id. § 1370.
251. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (discussing the
endangered snail darter); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (discussing the
endangered Lost River sucker and Shortnose sucker).
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dangered species found in water, the appropriate Commerce
Clause inquiry suggested by Supreme Court precedents is
whether the federal navigation power applies, which in turn
depends on whether the waters are navigable or reasonably
linked with navigable waters. Conversely, for endangered
species found on land, the appropriate inquiry based on the
Court's precedents is whether the regulated activities sub-
stantially affect interstate economic interests. Therefore, the
appropriate constitutional inquiry may depend on which en-
vironmental medium is affected. This potential anomaly sug-
gests once more the need for a more complete integration of
the federal commerce power and the federal navigation
power.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal power to regulate navigable waters is an his-
toric constitutional doctrine that does not fit neatly into the
Supreme Court's modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
The federal navigation power was developed when the states
were thought to have virtually unlimited authority to regu-
late their water resources, subject only to the paramount fed-
eral power to regulate navigation. Under the Court's modem
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the federal gov-
ernment has broad authority to regulate commerce among the
states, subject only to the limitation that the regulated activ-
ity must "substantially affect" interstate economic interests.
Because of their historical differences, the federal commerce
power and the federal navigation power may lead to anoma-
lies depending on whether federal regulation applies to water
or other mediums of commerce. The Supreme Court needs to
squarely address these differences and reconcile them in a
way that allows federal regulation of water resources for truly
national purposes and that preserves the states' historic au-
thority to regulate such resources for essentially local pur-
poses. Ultimately, the courts rather than Congress are re-
sponsible for addressing and resolving these constitutional
questions.
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